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Protecting the environment is now a major aspect of corporate social responsibility and there 
is an increasing interest in carbon emissions reporting due to the growing pressure from major 
initiatives such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 
which have exerted increasing pressure on firms to be more transparent about their non-
financial information, including carbon emissions. Moreover, emissions trading systems (ETS) 
and carbon taxes in many countries have emerged as key public policies for reducing carbon 
emissions. Consequently, carbon disclosure has become a critical part of annual business 
reporting. However, voluntary carbon disclosure includes private information on future 
sustainability that external stakeholders cannot easily verify. It is questioned that some of the 
disclosed information might be subject to manipulation (i.e. ‘greenwashing’) by managers. 
Consequently, strong demand is emerging for independent assurance on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
disclosure. However, the literature on the assurance of carbon emissions remains very sparse 
(Simnett et al. 2009a; Datt et al. 2018) and prior studies have mainly focused on the incentives 
for voluntary adoption of carbon assurance from legitimacy and institutional perspectives, 
choice of assurance provider, the role of internal auditors in GHG reporting, the expertise 
required for GHG assurance and the development of an international standard for GHG 
assurance. Yet researchers’ understanding of this new type of assurance is very limited given 
the scarcity of literature in this area. Thus, this thesis fills this gap by study carbon assurance 
from two perspectives, the determinants and the impacts of carbon assurance by utilising an 
international sample.  
Firstly, this study provides an insight into the determinants of carbon assurance from 
information asymmetry perspective. Prior studies provide findings that a well-designed 
assurance process and demonstrable competencies in an assurance team can mitigate 
information asymmetry, thereby enhancing user confidence pertaining to the credibility of 
disclosure (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Casey and Grenier 2014). Despite the existence of 
differentially informed managers and outsiders, there are few studies on carbon information 
asymmetry, thus motivates this research to focus on this unique type information asymmetry 
as a fundamental factor that leads the managerial decision to select an external assurer to 
verify their carbon emissions data. Drawing on information asymmetry theory and using data 
from the CDP, this study finds that firms with higher carbon information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders have greater incentives to voluntarily engage an external party for the 
independent assurance of their greenhouse gas statements. The results show that the proxies 
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for carbon information asymmetry (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions, energy structure) are 
significantly associated with the adoption of carbon assurance. Further analyses suggest that 
the probability of carbon assurance is enhanced when carbon disclosure is inadequate to 
diminish information asymmetry. Finally, the sample companies adopted carbon assurance in 
addition to financial auditing. This highlights the key point that resolving carbon information 
asymmetry requires carbon assurance, which cannot be substituted for by financial auditing. 
While carbon assurance is expected to influence investors’ perceptions on the carbon 
information disclosed, there is limited knowledge on the effect of carbon assurance on 
disclosure. Thus the second step of this study is to explore how firms benefit from the purchase 
of carbon assurance, specifically the role carbon assurance plays in firms’ voluntary carbon 
disclosure quality. Drawing on stakeholder engagement theory, the results show that assured 
companies tend to have greater carbon disclosure in the year after they obtain assurance than 
unassured companies. This relationship is stronger in stakeholder-oriented countries, countries 
with emissions trading schemes, and carbon-intensive industries. It is also found that external 
assurance accelerates the convergence of carbon disclosure (measured using standard deviation 
of disclosure score). These findings suggest that although auditors are not expected to be 
directly involved in the preparation of a carbon report, their recommendations may enhance 
managerial reporting capability and improve future carbon disclosure, implying carbon 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and Significance of the Study 
There is growing scientific evidence that the average surface temperature has risen 0.85°C 
since 1880 and the planet is on track for more than 2°C and possibly more than 4°C further 
warming by the end of 2100 (IPCC 2014). As climate change intensifies, a wide range of 
climate-related risks to health and economic growth are projected (IPCC 2018). Climate 
change will cause serious damages, including shortages of food and water, decreased 
biodiversity and increased extreme weather in most inhabited regions in the world (IPCC 
2014). The consensus is that human activities and influence are the predominant cause of 
climate warming. Thus, the Paris Agreement established a cap to limit global warming to well 
below 2°C, which requires a fundamental transition towards net-zero emissions in the future. 
This goal poses huge technological and economic challenges, but delaying action will 
significantly accelerate the risk (IPCC 2014; IPCC 2018). Reinforcing the global reaction to 
this hazard and eradicating fossil fuels entails a wide range of reduction choices, greater green 
investment, enhanced adaptation capacity and the stimulation of technological innovation 
(IPCC 2018). This may have huge implications for business operations and bottom lines. All 
companies, but particularly those with heavy carbon footprints, are expected to implement 
substantive measures to improve their carbon management systems, adequately assess 
climate-related risks and opportunities, and effectively build their resilience to climate 
challenges. 
The growing interest in carbon emissions reporting and how market participants respond to the 
disclosure of relevant carbon information stems partly from increasing pressure from recent 
major initiatives such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), which have exerted increasing pressure on firms to be more transparent about their non-
financial information, including carbon emissions. The growing interest can also be tied to the 
onset of emissions trading systems (ETS) and carbon taxes in many countries, which have 
emerged as key public policies for reducing carbon emissions. Consequently, carbon disclosure 
has become a critical part of annual business reporting. However, the quality and reliability of 
voluntarily disclosed information are criticised by many studies (Freedman and Jaggi 2005; 
Stanny and Ely 2008; Reid and Toffel 2009; Lyon and Maxwell 2011; Gouldson and Sullivan 
2007; Doda et al. 2016), especially carbon emission information as the measurement of Scope 
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1, 2 and 3 carbon emissions are of high complexity.1 In addition, voluntary carbon disclosure 
may involve information other than simply carbon emissions. For example, firms also disclose 
information on their carbon management and governance such as the set of positions in the 
management team that are directly responsible for climate change issues, the risk management 
procedures in place to deal with climate change risks and opportunities, the integration of 
climate change into business strategy and process, the internal carbon price used, the 
engagement in activities or events that have impacts on public policies regarding climate 
change, the established carbon emission reduction targets, the usage of renewable energy, etc. 
It is questioned that some of the disclosed information might be subject to manipulation (i.e. 
‘greenwashing’) by managers. Greenwashing refers to managers’ selectively disclosing 
positive information regarding corporate carbon performance while avoiding negative 
information (Lyon and Maxwell 2011). Consequently, strong demand is emerging for 
independent verification of reports on greenhouse gas (GHG) (GHG; Green and Li 2011; Luo 
and Tang 2014; Zhou et al. 2016; Becker et al. 1998; De Beelde and Tuybens 2015; Francis 
and Schipper 1999; Francis 2004; Hay and Davis 2004; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). External 
carbon assurance2 is helpful to enhance the credibility of carbon information disclosed by firms 
(Zhou et al. 2016; Kolk et al. 2008). However, few regulations and standards apply to this 
assurance (Zhou et al. 2016). The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) has issued ISAE 3410, which stipulates specific guidelines for GHG statement 
assurance (IAASB 2012).  
Nevertheless, the literature on the assurance of carbon emissions remains very sparse (Simnett 
et al. 2009a; Datt et al. 2018). Prior studies have mainly focused on the incentives for voluntary 
adoption of carbon assurance from legitimacy and institutional perspectives (Green and Zhou 
2013; Datt et al. 2018; Datt et al. 2018a; Datt et al. 2018b), choice of assurance provider 
(Huggins et al. 2011; Green and Taylor 2013), the role of internal auditors in GHG reporting 
 
1Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions pertaining to sources owned or controlled by the entity, while Scope 2 
relate to an entity’s emissions, which are indirect GHG emissions from energy transferred to and consumed by 
the firm (e.g., the utilisation of purchased electricity). Scope 3 emissions are indirect and are associated with 
employee commutes, business travel, waste disposal, product disposal, the leasing of assets, and so on 
(www.epa.gov/aintrnt.gh.index). 
 
2 The term carbon assurance used in this study refers to assurance of carbon emission disclosure which should 
comply with third party verification standards aknowleged by CDP and should meet the criteria of relevance, 
competency, independence, terminology, methodology and availability. For example, AA1000AS, ASAE3000, 
Australia National Greenhouse and Energy Regulations 2 (NGER Act), ISAE 3410, Assurance Engagements on 
Greenhouse Gas Statements, Verification under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) Directive and EU 




(Trotman and Trotman 2013), the expertise required for GHG assurance (Green and Li 2011), 
the development of an international standard for GHG assurance (Cohen and Simnett 2014). 
Yet researchers’ understanding of this new type of assurance is very limited given the scarcity 
of literature in this area (KPMG 2015) and there is limited knowledge on the effect of carbon 
assurance on disclosure. Therefore, this study fills this gap by exploring the determinants and 
impacts of carbon assurance.  
Firstly, this study provides an insight into the determinants of carbon assurance from 
information asymmetry perspective. A convergence of opinions is seen in the literature that 
auditors and assurance providers are independent of firm managers and can assess the fairness 
of the information disclosed thanks to their professional expertise and skill in processing and 
reporting information (Leftwich 1983; Blackwell et al. 1998). Prior studies provide findings 
that a well-designed assurance process and demonstrable competencies in an assurance team 
can mitigate information asymmetry, thereby enhancing user confidence pertaining to the 
credibility of disclosure (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Casey and Grenier 2014). Thus, assurance is a 
differentiated tool that allows a company to signal a degree of reliability of the underlying 
information, not just a standardised commodity determined exclusively by regulation (Ball et 
al. 2012). Watts and Zimmerman (1990)posit that firms with opaque information bear the cost 
of information asymmetry, which incentivises firms to adopt expensive assurance. Despite the 
existence of differentially informed managers and outsiders, there are few studies on carbon 
information asymmetry, thus motivates this research to focus on this unique type of information 
asymmetry as a fundamental factor that leads the managerial decision to select an external 
assurer to verify their carbon emissions data. 
While carbon assurance is expected to influence investors’ perceptions of the carbon 
information disclosed, there is limited knowledge on the effect of carbon assurance on 
disclosure. Thus, after examining the factors that influence managers’ adoption of carbon 
assurance, this study further explores how firms benefit from the purchase of carbon assurance, 
specifically the role carbon assurance plays in firms’ voluntary carbon disclosure quality. These 
perspectives have not been explored in the literature. By employing stakeholder engagement 
theory (Edgley et al. 2010), this study argues that independent verification on carbon disclosure 
help enhance firms’ internal reporting systems thus contributing to a better disclosure quality 
in the future. When a firm involves an assurance on its carbon disclosure, the assurance 
provider could benefit managers by providing professional knowledge and advice on the how 
4 
 
and what to disclose as they have a better understanding on the needs of external stakeholders 
for carbon information. In addition, assurance providers could identify defects in firms’ internal 
control systems and reporting process which help enhance the carbon reporting and 
management systems. Such interaction is expected to positively influence firms’ future carbon 
reporting.  
1.2 The Objectives and Research Questions of the Study 
This study aims to answer two research questions. First, what factors motivate managers to 
engage voluntary independent carbon assurance on their carbon information disclosed? Second, 
how does such third party assurance impact firms’ future carbon disclosure? 
In order to answer these questions, two objectives are identified. The first objective is to 
identify the determinants of managers’ purchase of carbon assurance from information 
asymmetry perspective at firm level. The second objective is to explore the relationship 
between carbon assurance and carbon disclosure quality. Information asymmetry theory, 
carbon information asymmetry theory, stakeholder engagement theory and institutional theory 
are employed to guide the design of the research methodology, to address the questions and to 
achieve the objectives.  
1.3 Research Methodology of the Study 
Quantitative approach involves “the generation of data in quantitative form, which can be 
subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis in a formal and rigid fashion” (Goddard and Melville 
2004). Quantitative strategy allows the formulation and verification for hypothesis, and helps 
to reveal causal explanations and fundamental laws (Easterby-Smith and Thorpe 1991; 
Amaratunga et al. 2002). 
This study utilises an international dataset and adopts quantitative research methods. Firstly, a 
descriptive analysis will be used to illustrate the carbon assurance patterns in different countries 
and industries based on the study of the 6-year carbon assurance data and other carbon-related 
information. Secondly, to assess the determinants of carbon assurance and the relationship 
between carbon assurance and carbon disclosure quality, logistic panel analysis will be 
employed. The sample for this study is extracted from the CDP database. The detailed research 
design, including sample selection, research model specification and measurements, for each 
research objective are presented and discussed in Section 4.4 and Section 5.4, respectively.  
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1.4 Contributions of the Study 
Contrary to previous studies on sustainability (Casey and Grenier 2014), this study focuses 
solely on carbon assurance. This study makes unique contributions to the literature on green 
accounting and carbon assurance.  
First, this study contributes to the literature on carbon assurance which is an important 
dimension of carbon accounting. There has been little study on this emerging practice (Datt et 
al. 2018), so this study extends the research on financial auditing to carbon assurance because 
carbon emissions are a serious threat to sustainability (Lash and Wellington 2007). Performing 
carbon assurance requires specific skills, knowledge, and expertise and is governed by separate 
standards (IAASB 2012; Tang 2019; Datt et al. 2018; Datt et al. 2018b). Firms are expected to 
have specific capabilities to reduce carbon emissions under a range of jurisdictional and 
institutional pressures (Luo et al. 2013). Carbon mitigation is a unique dimension of the broader 
concept of CSR (Strike et al. 2006; Walls et al. 2011), which deserves a separate study.  
Second, to my best knowledge, this is the first study to use carbon information asymmetry 
theory to explain the adoption of carbon assurance. Reducing carbon information asymmetry 
entails carbon assurance that cannot be substituted with financial auditing. This study uses 
innovative proxies, namely the quantity of emissions, type of fuels used and membership in a 
carbon-intensive sector, to capture different aspects of carbon information asymmetry 
underlying managerial incentives to adopt GHG assurance. The fact that firms in this study 
purchased carbon assurance in addition to financial auditing implies that carbon information 
asymmetry is a distinct dimension of information asymmetry concerning the authenticity of 
carbon information. 
Third, this study significantly validates and increases the applicability of information 
asymmetry theory in a nonfinancial setting by providing evidence that indicates the reactions 
of firms to global warming. Based on the fact that managers tend to use private informed data 
to contextualise their carbon performance and camouflage their inferior carbon policy, this 
study provides inferences that carbon assurance can enhance value (by reducing transaction 
costs), conditional on the severity of the carbon knowledge gap among the key stakeholders of 
a firm (Schiemann and Sakhel 2019).  
Fourth, this study is the first to provide empirical evidence of the effectiveness of carbon 
assurance in enhancing carbon disclosure from stakeholder engagement aspects. Prior studies 
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on carbon assurance have mainly focused on the incentives for voluntary adoption of carbon 
assurance, choice of assurance provider, the role of internal auditors in GHG reporting, the 
expertise required for GHG assurance, the development of an international standard for GHG 
assurance. However, while carbon assurance is expected to impact users’ perceptions, there is 
limited knowledge on the effect of carbon assurance on disclosure. This study documents that 
the engagement of carbon assurance can improve firms’ carbon reporting systems so as to lead 
to a better future carbon disclosure. 
Fifth, this study enhances the understanding of the role of the institutional context in carbon 
disclosure and assurance. There is no research on how these industrial and national factors 
moderate the link between carbon assurance and carbon disclosure. Last, Edgley et al. (2010) 
show the importance of stakeholder engagement in environmental assurance. The findings 
reinforce the validity and appropriateness of this concept in the carbon assurance practice. The 
evidence should assist assurance practitioners, regulators, and users of carbon reports in 
obtaining a better knowledge of this indispensable practice in today’s low-carbon economy.  
Finally, instead of using data from financial statements or CSR reports (Kolk 2003; Ballou et 
al. 2006), this study utilises data from the CDP. The CDP database encompasses the most 
complete and consistent information in comparison to alternative sources (Luo et al. 2012). In 
contrast to sustainability or CSR reports, which are subject entirely to managers’ discretion, 
CDP employs a single set of guidelines that all participants are required to comply with, which 
ensures comparable responses between firms and minimises manipulation of the carbon data.  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides the introduction of an overview for the whole research including the 
motivation and significance of the study, the objectives and research questions, the research 
methodology employed and the contributions of the study.  
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework employed to explain the determinants of 
independent carbon assurance and the impacts of engaging carbon assurance on firms’ carbon 
disclosure quality. In this chapter, information asymmetry theory, carbon information 
asymmetry theory, stakeholder engagement theory and institutional theory are presented. 
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Chapter 3 provides a systematic review of the related literature. As carbon disclosure and 
assurance is a relatively new emerging field, previous studies on environmental, sustainability 
and financial accounting are also discussed in addition to studies on carbon area.  
Chapter 4 presents the examination of the first research objective: What are the motivations of 
firms to voluntarily engage carbon assurance on their carbon disclosure? This chapter focuses 
on the link between carbon assurance and carbon information asymmetry. Drawing on carbon 
information asymmetry theory, it is predicted that companies with higher carbon information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders have a greater incentive to voluntarily engage an 
external party for the independent assurance of their greenhouse gas statements. The results 
show that the three proxies adopted in this study, namely the quantity of emissions, energy 
structure and membership in carbon-intensive sectors, are significantly positive with the 
adoption of carbon assurance.  
Chapter 5 investigates the impacts of carbon assurance on corporate carbon disclosure quality. 
Drawing on stakeholder engagement theory, it is documented that firms engaging carbon 
assurance tend to have better carbon disclosure in the subsequent year than unassured firms. 
This relationship is more pronounced for firms in stakeholder-oriented countries, firms in 
countries with emissions trading schemes, and firms operating in carbon-intensive sectors. The 
results also show that third party assurance accelerates the convergence of carbon disclosure 
(measured using standard deviation of disclosure score). These findings suggest that although 
auditors are not expected to be directly involved in the preparation of a carbon report, their 
recommendations may enhance managerial reporting capability and improve future carbon 
disclosure, implying carbon assurance plays a significant role in corporate carbon management. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the entire research. In this chapter, the key findings of the study 
are summarised followed by a discussion on the main contributions. The implications of this 
study for policymakers, investors, corporate managers are also considered and discussed. 
Finally, the limitations of this study and potential opportunities for future study are presented. 
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Figure 1. 1: Structure of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of this study. To answer the two research 
questions, multiple theories that are employed in previous studies related to financial auditing 
and sustainability assurance are applied.   
In examining the first research question, the motivations of managers’ decision on carbon 
assurance adoption, information asymmetry theory is employed and based on which, carbon 
information asymmetry is developed in this study. Information asymmetry theory is often used 
to explain the role of auditing in financial statements. For instance, Chow et al. (1988) argue 
that financial auditing arises because of financial information asymmetry, the agency problem 
and related costs. This study extends this argument to carbon assurance, proposing that the 
adoption of voluntary GHG assurance is motivated by a need to reduce carbon information 
asymmetry between firms and their external stakeholders. Carbon information asymmetry is a 
unique dimension of information asymmetry. First, carbon accounting for GHG quantification 
entails entirely different types of knowledge and expertise than conventional financial 
accounting. In addition, voluntary disclosure of carbon information involves private 
information owned by managers. Outsiders are unable to access this information. Finally, 
because managers may be less committed to climate change, their carbon disclosure may not 
meet ethical standards3. Thus, third-party verification is necessary to add credibility to carbon 
disclosures. The assurer’s objectives are to provide reasonable or limited assurance that a firm’s 
carbon disclosure contains no material misstatements and has been prepared in accordance with 
applicable standards (IAASB 2012). Innovative variables are used in this study to proxy for 
carbon information asymmetry underlying managerial incentives to adopt GHG assurance.  
To examine the second research question, the effects of carbon assurance on carbon disclosure, 
stakeholder engagement theory and institutional theory are employed. Stakeholder engagement 
theory emphasizes interaction, communication, and cooperation between management and 
groups of stakeholders, including assurers. This study argues that assurance of carbon reports 
may improve their clients’ reporting systems so as to lead to a better future carbon disclosure. 
The underlying rationale is that, first, a firm engages carbon assurer to verify its information 
 
3 Climate change has evolved from an ethical  issue to one that has material impacts on financial performance, 
position and prospects. Information about the impacts of climate change should be considered as key to a 
reasonable investor’s decision making, and therefore as material in a disclosure context. 
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on emissions. Such engagement helps the firm understands the needs of external stakeholders 
for carbon-related information. Second, on completion of assurance, an auditor usually 
provides managers with a letter containing recommendations for fixing flaws in internal control 
and current reporting systems (Gay and Simnett 2018). Managers may subsequently use these 
recommendations to prepare their future carbon reports. This interactive mechanism is 
expected to positively impact firms’ future carbon disclosure. Furthermore, this study examines 
the effect of carbon assurance on other aspects of carbon disclosure, i.e. whether carbon 
disclosure exhibits some sign of convergence under the influence of assurance. According to 
institutional theory, elements of institutions tend to reduce variety toward organizational 
homogeneity. DiMaggio and Powell (2012) contend that isomorphism is the process that best 
describes this homogeneity, and the external environment (such as competition and 
institutional pressures to adaptation and adoption of new values, norms, and attitudes) drive 
these isomorphic changes. Isomorphism takes place via three mechanisms: coercive (external 
pressures exerted by other organizations such as governmental bodies), normative (stemming 
from professionalization) and mimetic (regarding the inclination of firms to imitate one another) 
processes (DiMaggio and Powell 2012; Scott 2013). Moreover, institutionalization is impacted 
by the continuously changing environment, and firms impact one another to absorb the changes 
(DiMaggio and Powell 2012). Institutional theory has been applied to analyze organizational 
participation in carbon emissions trading (Pinkse and Kolk 2009).  
Figure 2.1 summarises the theoretical frameworks employed to address the two research 
questions. The remainder of this chapter will discuss these theories in detail to explain the 











2.2 Information Asymmetry Theory 
Myers (1984) indicates that managers who act as agents of shareholders possess more 
knowledge of their firms than market participants. As such, this poses a challenge for external 
stakeholders to accurately undertake evaluation of a firm. Consequently, potential investors 
take price protection (e.g., with a discount of firm value) as compensation for the disadvantage 
of information asymmetry. This implies that firms with opaque information bear the cost of 
information asymmetry in an efficient market (not the uninformed users). Thus, information 
asymmetry creates adverse selection costs of external financing for firms. When these firms 
seek external funding, they face higher equity costs, which reduces the value of the investment 
and the firm (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
Myers (1984) information asymmetry theory has contributed significantly to the understanding 
of corporate financial and nonfinancial decisions. For instance, drawing on information quality 
and agency cost perspectives, Fosu et al. (2016) argue that information asymmetry has negative 
impacts on firm value. Similarly, advocates of the theory maintain that private information 
enables informed managers to hide poor performance and that investors cannot distinguish 
between good and poor performance, which evokes selection bias and extra transaction costs 
Research Question 1: 
The Determinants of Carbon 
Assurance: Carbon Information 
Asymmetry and Carbon 
Assurance 
Research Question 2: 
The Impacts of Carbon Assurance: 
Carbon Assurance and Carbon 
Disclosure 
Information Asymmetry Theory 
Carbon Information Asymmetry 
Theory 
Stakeholder Engagement Theory 
Institutional Theory 
Figure 2. 1: Theoretical Framework for the Two Research Questions 
12 
 
(Akerlof 1970). Further, information gaps can occur between managers and shareholders, 
between managers and creditors and between family and nonfamily directors. The relevant 
information can be financial or nonfinancial (Abdel-Khalik 1993). The negative effects 
incentivise directors to publicly disclose their private information, even without a legal 
requirement, to stimulate optimal allocation of capital (Verrecchia 2001) and lower transaction 
costs (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). 
Similarly, asymmetry of environmental information leads to voluntary social and 
environmental disclosure (Schiemann and Sakhel 2019). Simnett et al. (2009a) believe that 
financial disclosure only partially reflects firm value. Nonfinancial reports are needed to reveal 
firm value from various perspectives. Empirical studies support this notion. Using CSR scores 
from KLD STAT, Cho et al. (2013) reveal an association between disclosed CSR and 
information asymmetry. Cormier et al. (2011) find a reduction in the bid-ask spread due to 
corporate sustainability reports, and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) prove that firms that actively engage 
in CSR reporting are rewarded by the market with lower external financing costs. Similarly, 
Matsumura et al. (2014) report that GHG disclosure mitigates the undesirable effect that GHG 
emissions have on the firm value of US S&P 500 companies. 
2.3 Carbon Information Asymmetry Theory 
There is a consensus that separating ownership and control can result in information asymmetry 
between internal managers and external stakeholders. This asymmetry historically refers to 
financial information; however, it can be extended to nonfinancial information. Carbon 
information asymmetry is a unique dimension of information asymmetry. Yet carbon 
accounting for GHG quantification entails entirely different types of knowledge and expertise 
than conventional financial accounting. In addition, voluntary disclosure of carbon information 
involves private information owned by managers. Outsiders are unable to access this 
information. Finally, because managers may be less committed to climate change, their carbon 
disclosure may not meet ethical standards. Thus, third-party verification is necessary to add 
credibility to carbon disclosures. The assurer’s objectives are to provide reasonable or limited 
assurance that a firm’s carbon disclosure contains no material errors or omissions and the 
underlying GHG statement is prepared using applicable standards (IAASB 2012). 
GHG emissions and activities are largely sourced in managers’ private data, making them 
appropriate for external verification under the information asymmetry economics (Myers 1984). 
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This high information opacity does not allow users to evaluate a firm’s fundamental value and 
reduces the quality of the decisions of investors who want to invest permanently in competitive 
low-carbon technologies. This is because measuring GHG emissions is a task of high 
complexity, and a sound accounting and management system is required to process the 
recording and calculation of carbon emissions (Luo and Tang 2014). Such a system is 
necessarily internal and is difficult to observe directly from the outside. Most stakeholders lack 
environmental competencies and have limited or inferior cognitive ability regarding carbon 
issues, whereas managers can access timely carbon information and have superior capacity to 
process this information. The divergent knowledge and interpretation of carbon information 
between inside managers and outside parties may lead to poor judgement and decisions. Thus, 
an independent qualified assurer is often called in to reduce knowledge asymmetry and vouch 
for the credibility of the voluntarily revealed information, as well as to ensure its accuracy and 
completeness (Datt et al. 2018). Assurance can not only improve the disclosure quality but also 
contributes to the long-term enhancement of environmental management and control systems 
(Healy and Palepu 2001), including carbon asset management.  
2.4 Stakeholder Engagement Theory 
Stakeholder engagement, sometimes referred to as stakeholder inclusivity, emphasizes 
interaction, communication, and cooperation between management and groups of stakeholders, 
including assurers. Engagement and inclusivity is the commitment of those who have impacts 
on and who are impacted by an organisation to be responsible to and to be engaged in problem 
identification and correction. Inclusivity is defined as the stakeholders to participate in 
“developing and achieving an accountable and strategic response to sustainability” in 
AA1000AS4 and it emphasises the principals of materiality, inclusivity and responsiveness 
from the perspective of stakeholders. Based on stakeholder engagement theory (Edgley et al. 
2010), assurance of carbon reports may improve their clients’ reporting systems so as to lead 
to a better future carbon disclosure. The underlying rationale is that, first, assurers who adopt 
a stakeholder inclusivity approach understand better the needs of external stakeholders for 
carbon-related information particularly when an auditing firm’s network comprises 
multifaceted clients (Edgley et al. 2010). Thus, such assurance engagement involves greater 
 
4  The AA1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS) is a standard for sustainability assurance issued by the 
AccountAbility, an independent, global, not-for-profit organisation promoting accountability, sustainable 





interaction with external stakeholders, therefore ensuring that social and environmental 
reporting is responsive, complete and satisfies stakeholders’ need for information (Edgley et 
al. 2010; Thomson and Bebbington 2005; Owen et al. 2000).  These auditors are able to raise 
critical consciousness of environmental reporting rather than just passively and 
unquestioningly accept information (Edgley et al. 2010) and their opinions reflect the demand 
of users for information on physical emissions, carbon risks, carbon strategy and investment, 
and so on. Assurer can help managers select appropriate information and determine the scope 
and depth of this disclosure, thus, the underlying GHG report can be made more relevant and 
comprehensive. Moreover, on completion of assurance, an auditor usually provides managers 
with a letter containing recommendations for fixing flaws in internal control and current 
reporting systems (Gay and Simnett 2018). Managers may subsequently use these 
recommendations to prepare their future carbon reports. This interactive mechanism is 
expected to have a positive impact on firms’ future carbon disclosure.  
Second, assurance activities are likely to strengthen a client’s internal system (Baker and 
Owsen 2002; Elliott 1994). According to the authoritative guidelines (e.g. GRI, ISAE 3410), 
auditors need to identify deficiencies and recommend improvements to a company’s 
environmental management systems (Deegan et al. 2006; Moroney et al. 2012). Stakeholder 
inclusivity allows assurers to work closely with clients to evaluate the strength of internal 
systems, test the validity of outputs, detect risk, and identify misstatements due to poor process 
design and/or inadequate controls (Olson 2010). Although an auditor is not expected to design 
control measures, the auditor is able to recommend or suggest broader options for how the 
auditee can improve the system for future reporting purposes. This is evident in the research of 
Manetti and Toccafondi (2012), who find that the majority of assurance statements they 
analyzed included consultation from stakeholders in the formulation of assurers’ professional 
opinions, which is a common practice (Gay and Simnett 2018; Olson 2010). 
Third, auditors often maintain contact with clients to make them aware of changes in reporting 
protocols or associated legislation throughout the auditing. Auditors may also inform clients of 
the changing demands of other stakeholders, such as the community, supply chain partners, 
employees, and not-for-profit organizations, during or after the current auditing period. This 
will ultimately reflect in improved carbon reporting. As discussed by Moroney et al. (2012), 
the benefit of such assurance is lagged. It gradually influences managers’ behaviour and serves 
as a learning process for managers and stakeholders (Edgley et al. 2010). 
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Edgley et al. (2010) assess the managerial capture of social and environmental report assurance 
(SERA). Their qualitative data show that stakeholders are increasingly being included in SERA. 
Assurance is starting to help managers and stakeholders simultaneously and offer dual benefits. 
The assurance process can be described as “display[ing] some characteristics of a dialogical 
process, being stakeholder inclusive, demythologising and transformative, with assurors 
perceiving themselves as a ‘voice’ for stakeholders” (Edgley et al. 2010, , p532). With direct 
and indirect stakeholder inclusivity mechanisms, SERA influences managers’ attitudes toward 
a large range of stakeholders and the wider community, which can benefit both managers and 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, there are still barriers in the dialogue of SERA, which can be 
removed by assurers via educative and transformative processes. 
2.5 Institutional Theory 
According to institutional theory, elements of institutions tend to reduce variety toward 
organizational homogeneity. DiMaggio and Powell (2012) contend that isomorphism is the 
best way to describe the process of such homogeneity, and the external environment (such as 
competitive rivalry, institutional pressures to adaptation and adoption of new values, norms, 
and attitudes) drive these isomorphic changes. Isomorphism takes place via three mechanisms: 
coercive (external pressures exerted by other organizations such as governmental bodies), 
normative (stemming from professionalization) and mimetic processes (concerning the 
propensities of firms to imitate one another) (DiMaggio and Powell 2012; Scott 2013). 
Furthermore, institutionalization is impacted by the external changeable environment, and 
firms interact with each other to imbibe the changes (DiMaggio and Powell 2012). Institutional 
theory has been applied to analyze organizational participation in carbon emissions trading 
(Pinkse and Kolk 2009).  
Therefore, this study argues that corporate carbon disclosure tends to converge and this process 
is affected by external assurance. Third-party assurance is part of the external environment 
surrounding the firm, which represents outside influences from stakeholders. If a growing 
number of peer companies choose assurance, this is a coercive pressure on firms without 
assurance. Similarly, assurers may impose mimetic and normal pressure on their clients to 
implement a certain type of disclosure practice. Thus, the trend toward isomorphic practice will 
be more pronounced in companies with assurance than in those without assurance. Following 
de Aguiar and Bebbington (2014), this study uses the standard deviation of the carbon 
disclosure score as a measure of the convergence or homogeneity of carbon disclosure. It is 
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expected that the standard deviation will be smaller in the cohort of assured companies than 
unassured companies. The test shows that assured companies not only obtained a higher 
disclosure score (84.19) than unassured companies (71.01), but also the standard deviation of 
the score for assured companies (14.36) is lower than that for unassured companies (16.18). 
Levene’s test is run to assess the equality of standard deviations (variance) of the two disclosure 
scores and find the difference is significant at the 0.01 level (F = 52.01). This preliminary 
evidence is consistent with institutional theory. Despite assured CDP participants differ from 
one another in terms of size, economic activity, level of emissions, the volume of disclosures, 
their reports are more converged compared to the matched pair unassured cohort. One 
mechanism through which for the isomorphism to occur could be that the GHG monitoring, 
reporting, and verification process is gradually becoming institutionalized around the world 
particularly with ETS. External assurance (i.e. verification) not only enhances carbon 
disclosure but also accelerates the speed of isomorphism toward more comparable and 
consistent carbon reporting. This evidence corroborates the finding of de Aguiar and 
Bebbington (2014).  
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has introduced four theories, namely information asymmetry theory, carbon 
information asymmetry theory, stakeholder engagement theory and institutional theory, that 
will be employed to explain the two research objectives.  
Information asymmetry theory and carbon information asymmetry theory will be utilised in 
Chapter 4 to explain managers’ decision to adopt carbon assurance.  Three factors are identified 
as proxies for carbon information asymmetry. They are the quantity of emissions, energy 
structure and membership in a carbon-intensive sector. Firms with high volume of emissions, 
complicated energy structure and operating in carbon-intensive sectors are inherently 
subjective to high complex measurement of carbon emissions. Moreover, such information is 
largely gathered from managers’ private data, which makes it hard to be observed, verified and 
evaluated by outside users (Myers 1984) who usually lack capability in processing carbon 
information while managers have timely access to these data and have superior capability in 
analysing the data. The divergent knowledge and interpretation of carbon information between 
inside managers and outside parties may lead to poor judgement and decisions and carbon 
information asymmetry arises. Thus, an independent qualified assurer is often called in to 
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reduce such information asymmetry and vouch for the credibility of the voluntarily revealed 
information, as well as to ensure its accuracy and completeness (Datt et al. 2018). 
Stakeholder engagement theory and institutional theory will be employed in Chapter 5 to 
explain the relationship between carbon assurance and carbon disclosure. Based on stakeholder 
engagement theory (Edgley et al. 2010), it is argued that assurance provider understands the 
needs of external stakeholders for carbon-related information better than managers, and they 
usually provide managers with a letter that includes recommendations for addressing issues 
they identified in the internal control and reporting systems, their engagement may help 
enhance firm’s carbon reporting systems, which will contribute to better disclosure quality in 
the future. Institutional theory is utilised to explain the signs of convergence of carbon 
disclosure under the impacts of assurance. 
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review the related literature in sustainability/carbon assurance. Specifically, 
carbon assurance practice and related regulations, the impact of climate change on business, 
financial versus carbon information asymmetry and financial versus GHG assurance, 
CSR/sustainability assurance and stakeholder engagement and managerial capture and 
impression management will be discussed. The purpose of the literature review is to provide 
comprehensive knowledge of carbon assurance and related area. Research ideas, research 
methodology and findings of key related studies will be summarised. The gaps and problems 
in carbon assurance study will be demonstrated and thus identify how this study will fill the 
gap and contribute to the study of carbon assurance. 
3.2 Information Asymmetry and Carbon Assurance  
3.2.1 Cost of information asymmetry 
It is documented in previous studies that firms without transparent information bear the costs 
of information asymmetry in efficient markets. Therefore, information asymmetry brings 
adverse selection cost of external financing to enterprises, and these companies will face higher 
equity cost when seeking external funds, thus reducing the investment and value of the 
company(Watts and Zimmerman 1990).  
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Under the pecking order and agency cost theoretical frameworks, Fosu et al. (2016) use UK 
sample for the period 1995 to 2013 to explore the impacts of information asymmetry on firm 
value. Dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and analysts’ forecast error are used to proxy for 
information asymmetry. They document that there’s a negative association between 
information asymmetry and firm value and this relation is conditional on debt financing, growth 
opportunities and financial crises.  
Similarly, He et al. (2013) adopt a sample of Australian listed companies from a period of 
2001-2008 to explore the relationship between information asymmetry and the cost of equity 
financing. By employing a refined proxy for information asymmetry in the study of Lin et al. 
(1995), namely the adverse selection element of the bid-ask spread of companies, they 
document a statistically significant and positive association between information asymmetry 
and return on equity and this relationship is more pronounced in financials, health care, oil and 
gas and utilities sectors. They argue that the rationale behind the inverse relationship is that 
when investors recognise that they are in an information disadvantage situation, they will 
diverse their investments to other places where they are more informed and their disadvantage 
is less. This will lead to a downward movement of price of securities with high information 
asymmetry and thus increases their capital cost (Easley and O'hara 2004). 
By employing a global sample consisting of 13,019 companies from 1997 to 2007, Gao and 
Zhu (2015) study the impact of information asymmetry on capital structure. Their results 
suggest that information asymmetry has negative impacts on equity financing and has no 
significant impacts on debt financing. In addition, they find that companies subjective to lower 
levels of asymmetry in information have higher propensity to employ long-term debt financing 
as the cost of which is more susceptible to information. Furthermore, they document that the 
impact of information asymmetry on firm leverage is conditional on some institutional factors. 
Specifically, they argue that a healthier banking system and enforced bankruptcy environment 
help impel corporate borrowing as economies of scare could be achieved by financial 
intermediaries in lending activities while strongly enforced bankruptcy codes provide better 
investor protection. Thus when companies operating in a country with a more sophisticated and 
developed banking system and explicitly bankruptcy codes, the positive correlation between 
information asymmetry and firm debt financing is more pronounced.  
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3.2.2 Disclosure as a tool to reduce information asymmetry 
Advocates of the theory maintain that private information enables informed managers to hide 
poor performance and that investors cannot distinguish between good and poor performance, 
which evokes selection bias and extra transaction costs (Akerlof 1970). Further, information 
gaps can occur between managers and shareholders, between managers and creditors and 
between family and nonfamily directors. In order to avoid the adverse selection of information 
asymmetry, firms try to disclose more to reduce the information asymmetry between internal 
managers and external stakeholders. The relevant information can be financial or nonfinancial 
(Abdel-Khalik 1993). Asymmetry of environmental information leads to voluntary social and 
environmental disclosure (Schiemann and Sakhel 2019). The negative impacts of information 
asymmetry incentivise firms to publicly disclose their private information.  
Verrecchia (2001) discusses the information asymmetry element of the capital cost which refers 
to as the component that investors discount the equity issues of a firm when expecting the 
occurrence of transaction costs that could derive from adverse selection. Therefore, to improve 
the efficiency firms gain advantage from increasing information transparency, thus reducing 
the cost of capital that arises from information asymmetry element. Committing to a high level 
of public disclosure is effective for reducing information asymmetry. For example, companies 
could prepare financial statements using more transparent accounting standards and 
frameworks and build a more sophisticated disclosure system to improve the disclosure quality.  
Similarly, asymmetry of environmental information leads to voluntary social and 
environmental disclosure (Schiemann and Sakhel 2019). Simnett et al. (2009b) believe that 
financial disclosure only partially reflects firm value. Nonfinancial reports are needed to reveal 
firm value from various perspectives. Empirical studies support this notion.  
Using CSR scores from KLD STAT, Cho et al. (2013) examine the association between 
disclosed CSR and information asymmetry and how this relationship is affected by institutional 
ownership. The bid-ask spread is employed as the proxy for information asymmetry and find 
that firms that achieve higher CSR scores are more likely to have lower information asymmetry. 
Moreover, the negative CSR scores have a stronger impact in reducing information asymmetry. 
When examining the moderating role that institutional investors play on the relationship, they 
document a negative relationship between CSR scores and the bid-ask spread is weakened for 
firms with higher levels of institutional ownership as institutional investors are regarded to 
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have an informational advantage regarding SCR performance as they generally have access to 
more information compared to other participants in the market and have superior capability in 
gathering and assessing information. On the contrary, less informed investors such as retail 
investors have less access to private and direct information from firms’ managements outside 
the public channels thus broaden the information asymmetry gap.  
Cormier et al. (2011) use a sample of Canadian companies, they first examine the impacts of 
two types of disclosure, namely social disclosure and environmental disclosure on the 
information asymmetry and then explore the drivers of social and environmental disclosure. 
By employing a simultaneous equations model and adopting share price volatility and bid/ask 
spread to proxy for information asymmetry between inside managers and outside investors they 
find that environmental disclosure, specifically the disclosure on environmental debts, risks 
and litigations reduces information asymmetry. Moreover, they document that environmental 
disclosure and social disclosure have a substitutional relationship in information asymmetry 
reduction. The results also suggest that firms with better performance in environmental issues, 
more media exposure, higher leverage and larger size tend to disclose more information on 
social and environmental issues.  
Some carbon emissions studies focus on exploring the economic consequences of carbon 
emissions. For example, Chapple et al. (2013) study a sample of 58 disclosures of Australian 
firms by using a revised Ohlson (1995) model and find that carbon emissions are negatively 
related to firm value. More specifically, these carbon-intensive firms suffer an equity valuation 
discount of 6.57 per cent of market capitalisation.  
In a Japanese context, Saka and Oshika (2014) examine the effect of carbon disclosure and 
carbon emissions on the firm value by using a sample of 1057 companies from 2006 to 2008. 
They find that carbon emissions negatively affect market equity capital, but carbon disclosure 
management has a positive impact on firm value and this impact is even stronger for firms in 
carbon-intensive sectors.  
Likewise, Matsumura et al. (2014) find that voluntarily reported carbon emissions are inversely 
associated with the market value of firms on the S&P 500. Specifically, the results suggest a 
valuation discount of $US212 per ton of carbon emissions for US companies. Moreover, they 
show that firms without emission disclosure face even higher penalty.  
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Clarkson et al. (2015) document a similar result, though the valuation penalty is much more 
moderate and benign in the European context in which they conducted the research.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) use independent CSR reports of around 650 U.S. firms to explore how 
voluntary CSR disclosure impacts the equity financing cost. Lead-lag approach is employed 
by them to address potential endogeneity issue and self-selection bias. The evidence shows that 
when firms receive higher cost of financing in the previous year, they are more likely to initiate 
CSR reporting in the current year. In other words, reducing equity financing cost motivates 
firm CSR reporting behaviour. They also explore the impacts of CSR reporting on firm’s equity 
financing cost and find that firms disclosing CSR performance are rewarded by the market by 
enjoying a lower equity financing cost in the subsequent year.  
Schiemann and Sakhel (2019) employ a sample of European firms over a period of 2011 to 
2013 from CDP database to study the impacts of the disclosure of physical risk regarding 
climate change on the information asymmetry. They follow the previous study on information 
asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) and employ bid-ask 
spreads as the proxy for information asymmetry. Based on the framework of information 
economics, they find that firms voluntarily disclose the information of physical risks are 
exposed to lower information asymmetry between internal managers and external investors. 
This relationship is more pronounced for firms participating in an ETS which are subject to 
more stringent climate change regulations and policies.  
3.2.3 Disclosure as a greenwashing tool that increases information asymmetry 
One of the major United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) climate 
policies involves monitoring, verification, and reporting (MVR) of carbon emissions. 
Nevertheless, some publicly revealed data (in particular, self-serving disclosures) only provide 
partial information and create uncertainty, which often obfuscates poor performance and thus 
enhances, instead of reducing, information asymmetry (Brown et al. 2009).  
Some authors suspect that managerial motivation of CSR disclosure is insincere (Brooks and 
Oikonomou 2018) and this type of disclosure appears to be an exercise of greenwashing. Such 
disclosure is intended to protect the legitimacy of the reporting firm (Mathews 1997) and 
establish an artificial green identification that improves the brand value and image of the entity 
(Hahn and Kühnen 2013).  
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Greenwashing is a multifaceted term modelled on the phrase, “whitewashing”, which indicates 
organised attempts to conceal unpleasant facts, particularly in a political paradigm. The 
purpose of greenwashing takes the same premise, except it involves using an apparently green 
facade in an environmental context. Greenwashing disclosure is structured to focus on positive 
factors and ignore negative effects to persuade the community that a firm is aware of the need 
for environmental protection and that their products and activities are sustainable. This 
provides a facade to disguise unsustainable corporate agendas and to repair public perception 
of a brand and thus maximise perceptions of legitimacy. Thus, without external monitoring and 
verification, this strategy amounts to corporate posturing and deceptive behaviour. 
3.2.4 Needs for assurance to reduce information asymmetry 
Therefore, voluntary information disclosure requires a mechanism to convey its credibility 
(Ball et al. 2000; Crawford and Sobel 1982; Stocken 2000). This creates demand, even in the 
absence of legally enforceable requirements, for external assurance among firm managers 
(Healy and Palepu 2001). A convergence of opinions is seen in the literature that auditors and 
assurance providers are independent of firm managers and can assess the fairness of the 
information disclosed thanks to their professional expertise and skill in processing and 
reporting information (Leftwich 1983; Blackwell et al. 1998).  
Fuhrmann et al. (2017) conduct content analysis of GRI assurance reports of 600 European 
companies in 2008 and 2009 to study the impacts of the assurance process design on the 
information asymmetry. Following the previous studies of Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and 
Hakim and Omri (2010), they employ Bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry 
and build OLS regression models to test the hypotheses. They provide findings that a well-
designed assurance process, including high assurance level, more assurance-specific work 
steps, and demonstrable competencies in an assurance team can mitigate information 
asymmetry, thereby enhancing user confidence pertaining to the credibility of disclosure.  
Thus, assurance is a differentiated tool that allows a company to signal a degree of reliability 
of the underlying information, not just a standardised commodity determined exclusively by 
regulation (Ball et al. 2012). Watts and Zimmerman (1990)posit that firms with opaque 
information bear the cost of information asymmetry, which incentivises firms to adopt 
expensive assurance.  
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3.2.4 Carbon assurance 
The purpose of an independent carbon assurance is to ensure that the underlying GHG report 
is prepared in line with an appropriate protocol, so that the information is credible and useful 
for decision making. The MVR policy is implemented differently in different jurisdictions. For 
example, emission data for emitters whose emissions are above the threshold are recorded in 
the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Clean Air Markets Division database. The 
publicly available disclosed GHG information is subject to the EPA monitoring provisions. In 
some countries (e.g., EU, China), carbon assurance is required for a small number of 
organisations—particularly those that participate in an Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) by an 
accredited assurance practitioner or provider. However, for most countries and the 
overwhelming majority of commercial organisations, carbon assurance remains voluntary. For 
example, in the United Kingdom (UK), it is mandatory for all listed firms to report GHG 
emissions, yet carbon assurance of the reported GHG emissions is optional (Liao et al. 2015). 
Under the setting of this study, companies that participated in a CDP survey were required to 
reveal their GHG emissions figures, but verification of the emissions was discretionary for the 
survey. In sum, carbon assurance is emerging as a burgeoning market and mainstream practice 
for accounting firms and other consultation organisations, and is playing an increasingly 
important role for corporate transition management towards a carbon-free future (Liao et al. 
2015). 
Simnett and Nugent (2007) is among the earliest studies to discuss the new emerging assurance 
on carbon emission disclosure. By analysing sustainability information disclosed by Australian 
firms in 2005, they find that only less than 10% firms report carbon emissions in their annual 
financial statements and only seven firms fully disclosed the information. They recommend 
firms to voluntarily disclose carbon information in their annual statements or standalone 
sustainability statements to ensure the completeness of carbon disclosure and emphasise the 
importance of having such disclosure audited or assured to improve the reliability and 
credibility of the disclosed information.    
Green and Zhou (2013) is one of the earliest empirical research papers in examining carbon 
assurance practice. Drawing on a sample of over 3,000 firms internationally over a period of 
2006 to 2008 from CDP database, they bring an insightful inspection on the new emerging 
assurance practice on carbon disclosure in the assurance market. They document that the 
number of firms employing third party assurance on carbon information disclosed is growing 
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during the study period and this trend synchronises with the growing awareness of the public 
on climate change issue and the increasing demand for credible and reliable carbon disclosure. 
The results reported suggest that firms operating in European countries and carbon-intensive 
sectors tend to be more active in engaging third party carbon assurance and account for the 
highest percentage in carbon assurance adoption. In terms of assurance provider, the data shows 
that auditing firms dominate the market. 
Olson (2010) identify the differences between financial auditing and carbon assurance. They 
point out that carbon assurance requires knowledge about the operations and production 
processes of clients and the underlying assumptions about the conversion of combustion data 
of different fuels to carbon emissions, as well as the basic accounting skills.  
Huggins et al. (2011) discuss different types of GHG assurance and the requirements of 
proposed ISAE 3410 on GHG assurance providers. They highlight that firms with high Scope 
1 emissions should use multi-disciplinary assurance providers who have both auditing expertise 
and subject matter knowledge to ensure the credibility and reliability of disclosed GHG 
information.  
Unlike conventional auditing of financial statements, which is monopolised by the accounting 
firms, carbon assurance operations are sometimes conducted by entities from outside the 
accounting field. These non-accountants are usually experts in a relevant area, such as 
engineering, energy efficiency, and environmental management (Zhou et al. 2016). Accounting 
professionals and consulting companies provide different advantages for carbon assurance. 
Green et al. (2017) firstly study the factors that drive managers decision of carbon assurance 
provider. They analyse the responses of 25 corporate officers from Australian companies to the 
survey questionnaire and find that firms tend to choose assurance teams and leaders who have 
better reputation and independence, as well as the superior capability in technical and assurance 
knowledge and communication skills. Thus building teams with efficient multidisciplinary 
capability is critical for assurance firms to gain competence in carbon assurance market.  
Zhou et al. (2016) examine the factors that influence managers’ decision of carbon assurance 
adoption and the assurance provider choice. They document that the business culture (whether 
firms are from a shareholder or stakeholder-orientated country) and the legal enforcement 
environment are significantly related to the firms’ purchase of independent assurance on carbon 
disclosure. Specifically, firms from stakeholder orientation countries and countries with 
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stringent legal enforcement environment tend to engage carbon assurance and this is 
relationship in conditional on corporate governance.  In terms of the assurance provider choice, 
they document that firms from stakeholder orientation countries have a preference to choose 
accounting firms over consulting firms and this relationship is stronger for firms with superior 
corporate governance.  
Datt et al. (2019) employ legitimacy theory to explain the determinants of carbon assurance 
engagement. They utilise a sample of US firms that disclose carbon information to CDP from 
2010 to 2013 to study how legitimacy threats impact the firm’s decision on purchasing third 
party assurance on their carbon information disclosed. They argue that carbon assurance arises 
as a response to legitimacy threat from growing public awareness of climate change issue and 
increasingly stringent climate change policies and regulations. Carbon emission intensity, firm 
size and firm leverage are employed as proxies for legitimacy threats. The empirical results 
suggest that firms with higher carbon emission intensity and larger size are more likely to use 
carbon assurance as high emitters are more subjective to carbon legislation thus are under 
higher pressure to reduce carbon emissions and are exposed to greater legitimacy threats, which 
motivates firms to adopt carbon assurance to close the legitimacy gap.  
By employing legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, Datt et al. (2020) further investigate 
the firms’ choice of carbon assurance provider. Based on a global sample of firms responding 
to CDP questionnaire from 2010 to 2014, they find that firms under higher pressure from 
stakeholders and climate change legislation are more likely to use accounting profession as 
assurance provider as accounting firms are superior in independency and assurance quality thus 
serving as a more credible signal for high quality disclosure. On the contrary, firms with 
established carbon governance, such as carbon reduction initiatives, carbon reduction 
incentives to staff and carbon disclosure transparency, prefer consulting firms over accounting 
firms as these firms are more motivated to improve their carbon management system and build 
up resilience capability to climate change rather than just achieve legitimacy purpose.  
Despite the existence of differentially informed managers and outsiders, there are few studies 
on carbon assurance (Datt et al. 2018b; Zhou et al. 2016), thus motivates this research to focus 
on carbon information asymmetry as a fundamental factor that leads the managerial decision 
to select an external assurer to verify their carbon emissions data. The findings add direct 
empirical evidence to the scant literature on this topic. 
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3.3 Financial versus Carbon Information Asymmetry and Financial versus GHG 
Assurance  
While financial statements focus on financial matters, carbon reports present information 
related to GHG emissions (including categorised removals) and carbon reduction activities 
over a particular period for a reporting entity for the decision making of users (ISAE 3410). 
Producing GHG statements may be required under a regulatory regime or may be voluntary. 
Various incentives exist for managers to manage earnings for purposes other than to provide 
a true and fair view of a firm’s financial performance. Similarly, directors may make 
disclosures intended to alter the perceptions of stakeholders by hiding the firm’s true carbon 
performance. Luo (2019) utilises a sample of Global 500 firms responding to CDP 
questionnaire over the period from 2008 to 2015 to examine the correlation between carbon 
disclosure level and firm’s true carbon emission reduction performance and how this 
relationship is moderated by carbon institutions. The results suggest a statistically significant 
and negative relationship between carbon disclosure level and carbon performance. 
Legitimacy theory is employed to explain the relationship. It is argued that firms disclose 
more carbon information doesn’t necessarily mean that they have better performance in 
carbon management. The rationale behind is that firms with higher volume of carbon 
emissions are under greater legitimacy threats, thus having motivation to provide more 
information and highlight the positive sides of their actions toward carbon reduction and 
carbon management. Moreover, the negative relationship between carbon disclosure level and 
carbon performance are found to be weakened in more stringent carbon institutions. 
Specifically, the negative relationship is less pronounced for firms in carbon-intensive sectors, 
firms operating in countries with stakeholder orientation and firms that participate in an ETS. 
Thus, biased climate information can be provoked by external climate legislation and 
institutions. This problem is further exacerbated by the lack of internationally recognised 
methods for measuring and quantifying GHG emissions. Based on a sample of 243 Global 
500 firms participating CDP, Tang and Luo (2016) examine the determinants of firms’ 
disclosure behaviour of carbon information. They document that firms with larger size, 
operating in carbon-intensive industries and relying more on debt financing are more likely 
to provide comprehensive carbon disclosure. In terms of country-level institutional factors, 
results suggest that the level of carbon disclosure is higher in countries with ETS and more 
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stringent climate legislation thus a more developed framework for carbon reporting and 
carbon assurance standards is needed.  
The central concept in this study is carbon information asymmetry. There is consensus that 
separating ownership and control can result in information asymmetry between inside 
managers and outside stakeholders. This asymmetry historically refers to financial 
information; however, it can be extended to nonfinancial information. Carbon information 
asymmetry is a unique dimension of information asymmetry. Yet carbon accounting for GHG 
quantification entails entirely different knowledge and expertise than conventional financial 
accounting. In addition, voluntary disclosure of carbon information involves private 
information owned by managers. Outsiders are unable to access this information. Finally, 
because managers may be less committed to climate change, their carbon disclosure may not 
meet ethical standards. Thus, third-party verification is necessary to add credibility to carbon 
disclosures. The objectives of the assurer are to provide reasonable or limited assurance that 
a firm’s GHG statement is free from material misstatements and has been prepared, in all 
material aspects, in accordance with applicable standards (IAASB 2012). 
The literature suggests some significant differences between financial assurance and carbon 
assurance (Datt et al. 2018). Unlike traditional financial statement auditing, which is 
monopolised by the accounting profession, GHG assurance operations are sometimes 
conducted by practitioners who are not in the accounting profession. These non-accountants 
are usually experts of relevant field, for example, engineering, energy efficiency, and 
environmental management (Simnett et al. 2009a; Huggins et al. 2011). Accounting 
professionals and environmental consulting companies provide different advantages for 
carbon assurance (Simnett et al. 2009a; Olson 2010; Huggins et al. 2011; Green and Zhou 
2013). Accounting professionals have a greater reputational capital advantage because of their 
flagship financial statement auditing services (Simnett et al. 2009a; Huggins et al. 2011); 
however, providers from consultation firms tend to be less expensive and are generally 
considered to have better subject expertise (Simnett et al. 2009a; Huggins et al. 2011; 
O’Dwyer et al. 2011). When taking GHG assurance, GHG assurers must assess risk and 
uncertainty, as a firm may not have a robust system in place to collect and process energy and 
carbon data. Moreover, GHG assurers use different investigative methods than traditional 
attestation (ISAE 3410). Further, a firm may have a unique internal control mechanism 
compatible with the complexity of its operations and the nature of its business (IAASB 2012). 
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In addition, misstatements might be related to the firm’s organisational structure and 
boundaries and related parties (IAASB 2012). Therefore, methods for controlling risk and 
examining GHG emissions in carbon assurance are expected to differ significantly from 
methods used in conventional financial auditing. 
3.4 CSR/Sustainability Assurance and Stakeholder Engagement  
As global warming is intensified, business organizations are expected to play a role in 
stabilizing climate change (Luo et al. 2012). There are multiple stakeholder groups with diverse 
attitudes toward climate change. Advocates of stakeholder theory assert the importance of a 
company engaging with a broader set of stakeholders to ensure its long-term survival and 
success, as stakeholders (both financial and nonfinancial) provide critical resources to the 
company with the expectation that their interests will be borne in mind (Hannan and Freeman 
1984; Simnett et al. 2009b; KPMG 2015). 
Roberts (1992) uses 1986 Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) reports published by 130 
companies from Fortune 500 over a period from 1984 to 1986 to investigate the drivers of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure based on stakeholder theory. The results suggest that 
the measurements of stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance are 
statistically significantly related to corporate social disclosure level.  
By employing stakeholder theory, Van der Laan Smith et al. (2005) explore the impacts of 
country of origin on the corporate social disclosure. They argue that the role of a company and 
its stakeholders plays on annual corporate social disclosure varies across countries. The results 
show that large firms from stakeholder-orientated countries tend to have higher levels and 
quality of corporate social disclosure than firms from shareholder-orientated countries.  
Given the emergence of sustainability-oriented stakeholders (i.e., those who have a 
sustainability mandate in their decision-making process) (Earl and Clift 1999; Al-Tuwaijri et 
al. 2004; Koellner et al. 2005; Dhaliwal et al. 2011), companies are expected to disclose 
increased environmental information (Gray and Bebbington 2001; Lacy et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, the quality and credibility of this information have been questioned in light of 
the lack of public trust in business institutions (Riffkin 2014). The financial literature posits 
that auditing is critical to constraining opportunistic disclosure and reduce information 
asymmetry (Watts and Zimmerman (1990); (Wallace 1987; Perego and Kolk 2012; Moroney 
et al. 2012). Similarly, sustainability assurance is a key element of scrutinizing social and/or 
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environmental information (Adams and Evans 2004; O'Dwyer and Owen 2005; Deegan et al. 
2006). It acts as a monitoring tool for managers (Wong and Millington 2014) and catalyzes 
effective and constructive dialogue with a company’s stakeholders (KPMG 2015). Edgley et al. 
(2010) contend sustainability assurance adds value for both management and stakeholders and 
links the accountability chain by engaging stakeholders in assurance processes (O'Dwyer and 
Owen 2005; Edgley et al. 2010). Simnett et al. (2009a) argue that sustainability assurance is 
critical because it assists firms in improving their environmental disclosure and reduces the 
incidence of opportunistic reporting. Notwithstanding, obtaining such assurance is voluntary 
and unregulated in most parts of the world. At present, there are no mandatory guidelines for 
carbon assurance despite the existence of a number of useful frames of reference 
(AccountAbility 2008); (GRI 2002), particularly ISAE 3000 and ISAE 3410 which guide 
specifically the assurance of GHG statements.   
3.5 Managerial Capture and Impression Management  
Prior literature has examined managerial incentives (such as Impression management, 
legitimation) to engage in environmental activities. Goffman (2002) suggests people can 
manage impressions of them by creating a front and concealment. Researchers have used this 
theory to reveal how a business constructs a false image of environmental accountability. 
Impression management in this context involves the opportunistic responses to climate change 
that refers to “greenwashing” behaviour. Greenwashing is a symbolic adherence to climate 
guidelines by exhibiting superficial gestures that do not decarbonize their operations (Moneva 
et al. 2006). The entity may strategically choose unregulated disclosure that does not address 
negative, systemic environmental consequences, but to alter the perceptions of users for 
legitimation purposes (Malsch 2013). Furthermore, impression management can also extend to 
voluntary environmental assurance where the process of assurance is controlled by the auditee. 
This activity is called managerial capture (Edgley et al. 2010) such assurance becomes a tool 
of legitimation by corporate managers (Power 1991; Edgley et al. 2010).  
Despite this, this study provides emerging empirical evidence that things have been improving 
in recent years, perhaps because of enhanced public awareness of the severe climate change 
and environmental protection. For instance, Edgley et al. (2010) assess the benefits and 
stakeholder engagement of social and environmental report assurance (SERA). Their 
qualitative data show that stakeholders are increasingly being engaged in SERA. Assurance is 
starting to help managers and stakeholders simultaneously and offer dual benefits. The 
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assurance process can be described as “display[ing] some characteristics of a dialogical process, 
being stakeholder inclusive, demythologising and transformative, with assurors perceiving 
themselves as a ‘voice’ for stakeholders” (Edgley et al. 2010, , p532). With engagement of 
stakeholders, SERA influences the attitudes of managers toward a large range of stakeholders 
and the wider community, which can benefit both managers and stakeholders. Nevertheless, 
there remain obstacles to dialogic SERA, which can be removed by assurers via educative and 
transformative processes. Similarly, O’Dwyer et al. (2011) suggest that the objective of 
engagement might be to seek legitimacy, in spite of this,  auditors are inclined  to work tightly 
with client managers and the users of the assurance statement, which can still improve the 
communication of the parties involved. In the context, carbon assurance shares many 
similarities with sustainability assurance. For example, both are none financial assurance and 
concerning general, or specific sustainability issue (i.e. carbon emissions). Most importantly, 
carbon assurance and sustainability assurance address the demand of none financial 
stakeholders (not just shareholders) who care about environmental problems. Thus, the 
stakeholder engagement theory is readily applicable in a climate change setting where more 
and more people are aware of the imminent threat of climate change. Although impression 
management remains a concern, the existence of other scenarios in which genuine managerial 
motives exist to boost carbon performance and stakeholder inclusivity in environmental/carbon 
assurance can not be ruled out (Edgley et al. 2010). This research thus uses this perspective to 




CHAPTER 4 CARBON INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND CARBON 
ASSURANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
The scientific literature demonstrates the growing effects of human activity on climate change 
(Stern et al. 2007). Corporations are considered to be responsible for reducing their carbon 
emissions to help stabilise climate change (Luo et al. 2012). Indeed, protecting the 
environment is becoming a major aspect of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Although 
the corporate disclosure of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions information is critical for the 
decision-making of users of corporate reporting (Thornton and Hsu 2001), the quality and 
reliability of such disclosures are not guaranteed (Freedman and Jaggi 2005; Stanny and Ely 
2008; Reid and Toffel 2009), given that Scope 1, 2 and 3 carbon emissions are difficult to 
measure.5 Further, GHG statements may incorporate other carbon-related information (e.g., 
information on carbon risk or carbon governance) and activities that are subject to 
manipulation by managers (i.e., greenwashing). Greenwashing occurs when managers 
selectively disclose positive information regarding corporate carbon performance without 
fully disclosing negative information (Lyon and Maxwell 2011). Thus, there is an increasing 
demand for external carbon assurance to enhance the credibility of carbon information 
disclosed by firms (Huggins et al. 2011; Kolk et al. 2008). However, few regulations and 
standards apply to this assurance (Zhou et al. 2016). The International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) has issued ISAE 3410, which stipulates specific guidelines for 
GHG statement assurance (International Federation of Accountants 2012). Nevertheless, the 
literature on the assurance of carbon emissions remains very sparse (Simnett et al. 2009a; Datt 
et al. 2018). Thus, this study fills this gap by studying the association between carbon 
information asymmetry and independent assurance of GHG statements. 
Information asymmetry theory is often used to explain the role of auditing in financial 
statements. For instance, Chow et al. (1988) argue that financial auditing arises because of 
financial information asymmetry, the agency problem and related costs. This study extends 
this argument to carbon assurance, proposing that the adoption of voluntary GHG assurance 
is motivated by a need to reduce carbon information asymmetry between inside managers and 
 
5 Scope 1 emissions are those directly emitted by sources owned or controlled by an entity, while the Scope 2 
category consists of indirect GHG emissions from energy transferred to and consumed by the entity (e.g., the 
utilisation of purchased electricity). Scope 3 emissions are indirect and are associated with employee commutes, 
business travel, waste disposal, product disposal, the leasing of assets, and so on (www.epa.gov/aintrnt.gh.index). 
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outside stakeholders. This study identifies certain factors (the quantity of emissions, type of 
fuels used and membership in a carbon-intensive sector) as proxies for carbon information 
asymmetry. It is predicted that these factors are related to the adoption of independent 
assurance. Using data from the CDP, I empirically test the predictions. The CDP is a 
nongovernmental, nonprofit organisation that provides information about companies’ GHG 
emissions and carbon activity and other GHG information. While carbon information 
disclosed to the CDP is comprehensive, some information cannot be readily verified by 
outside investors and stakeholders. Therefore, many firms choose to involve a third party to 
check their carbon disclosures. It is demonstrated that the degree of information asymmetry 
(actual or perceived by managers) drives the decision to adopt carbon assurance. The results 
are robust when I control for firm size, profitability, and leverage, which are potentially 
correlated with both carbon disclosure and the adoption of assurance. It is worth noting that 
the sample in this study covers large listed firms whose financial statements should be 
considered as transparent as they are audited by high-profile auditors. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the carbon information disclosed by these firms is transparent. Thus, 
carbon disclosure should be taken separately from traditional financial disclosures.  
The paper makes unique contributions to the literature on green accounting and carbon 
assurance. First, it is argued that assurance oriented to climate change is an important 
dimension in carbon accounting. However, few studies have considered this emerging 
practice (Datt et al. 2018), so this study extends the research on financial auditing to carbon 
assurance because carbon emissions are a serious threat to sustainability (Lash and Wellington 
2007). Firms are expected to have specific capabilities to reduce carbon emissions under a 
range of jurisdictional and institutional pressures (Luo et al. 2013). Carbon mitigation is a 
unique dimension of the broader concept of CSR (Chatterji et al. 2009; Strike et al. 2006; 
Walls et al. 2011), which deserves a separate study. Second, to my best knowledge, this is the 
first study to use carbon information asymmetry theory to explain the adoption of carbon 
assurance. This study uses innovative variables to proxy for carbon information asymmetry 
underlying managerial incentives to adopt GHG assurance. Third, this research enhances the 
validity and applicability of information asymmetry theory in a nonfinancial setting by 
explaining the reactions of firms to global warming. Finally, instead of using data from 
financial statements or CSR reports (Kolk 2003; Ballou et al. 2006), this study utilises data 
from the CDP. The CDP database contains more complete and consistent information than 
alternative sources (Luo et al. 2012) as the CDP employs a single set of guidelines that all 
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participants are required to comply with, which minimises manipulation of the carbon data. 
In sum, this study offers new and nuanced insights, which should prove useful for lawmakers 
in relation to the development of policy initiatives. Additionally, it may help accountants to 
provide services in a burgeoning and highly promising market. 
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 elaborates the 
distinction between financial statement assurance and GHG statement assurance. Section 3 
presents the literature and hypothesis development. Section 4 provides a description of the 
sample selection and research model, with Section 5 reporting the empirical results. A 
summary of the findings and a discussion of future research avenues is given in Section 6. 
4.2 Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Carbon information asymmetry and carbon assurance 
GHG emissions and activities are largely sourced in managers’ private data, making them 
appropriate for external verification under the concepts of information asymmetry economics 
(Myers 1984). This high information opacity does not allow users to evaluate a firm’s 
fundamental value and reduces the quality of the decisions of investors who want to invest 
permanently in competitive low-carbon technologies. This is because measuring GHG 
emissions is a task of high complexity, and a sound accounting and management system is 
required to process the recording and calculation of carbon emissions (Luo and Tang 2014). 
Such a system is necessarily internal and is difficult to observe directly from the outside. Most 
stakeholders lack environmental competencies and have limited or inferior cognitive ability 
regarding carbon issues, whereas managers can access timely carbon information and have 
superior capacity to process this information. The divergent knowledge and interpretation of 
carbon information between inside managers and outside parties may lead to poor judgement 
and decisions. Thus, an independent qualified assurer is often called in to reduce knowledge 
asymmetry and vouch for the credibility of the voluntarily revealed information, as well as to 
ensure its accuracy and completeness (Datt et al. 2018). Assurance not only enhances the 
quality of disclosures but also contributes to the long-term improvement of environmental 
management systems (Healy and Palepu 2001), including carbon asset management. 
Following this reasoning, it can be argued that the greater the degree of carbon information 
asymmetry, the more likely it is that firms will adopt carbon assurance. With reference to this 
discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H1: There is a positive relationship between carbon information asymmetry and the adoption 
of external carbon assurance. 
Although carbon information asymmetry is ubiquitous in all businesses, not all firms that 
disclose carbon information adopt third-party assurance. We argue that this is because of the 
differing degrees of carbon information asymmetry among these firms. If this is a negligible 
issue, carbon assurance may be unnecessary. Only a severe information gap warrants external 
assurance, that is, only the benefit of closing such a gap would be sufficiently great to cover 
the cost of doing so (e.g., fees paid to the assurance providers). Hence, the net benefit of 
assurance is likely to accrue to firms with wide carbon information asymmetry. To empirically 
test this hypothesis, we must identify variables that can be used as proxies for carbon 
information asymmetry. Statistically significant coefficients of these proxy variables would 
imply that firms are motivated to adopt GHG assurance to bridge the gap of information 
between insiders and outsiders. 
Carbon emissions 
One factor underlying carbon information asymmetry is the quantity of GHG emissions, as it 
increases measurement complexity. GHG accounting involves managers’ estimates of energy 
consumption, modelling inputs and assumptions, as well as the adoption of appropriate 
methodologies for quantifying Scope 1, 2 and 3 carbon emissions. The higher the carbon 
emissions, the more complex the methods used to account for GHG emissions and the more 
uncertain the assumptions (Nordhaus 1992). Further, heavy emissions are often sourced from 
multiple operations, products and services, and from multiple departments in a firm. Thus, they 
are linked with a variety of assets and liabilities and with a sophisticated organisational 
structure, and it is subsequently not practical or realistic for users to track their sources. This 
inevitably increases the knowledge gap between outsiders and insiders and erodes or even 
destroys stakeholders’ trust and confidence in a firm’s carbon report. Because firms with higher 
emissions are exposed to greater scrutiny from the public, corporate carbon opacity may raise 
serious concerns about a firm’s impact on the climate and jeopardise its image and reputation 
(Patten 2002). This motivates managers to provide a clear and credible picture of a firm’s 
carbon performance. Higher emissions exacerbate information opaqueness and highlight the 
need for independent assurance to guarantee the integrity of the reported information (Green 
and Li 2011). Thus, firms with excessive emissions tend to adopt expensive independent 
assurance to signal that they are concerned and responsible entities. Based on this argument, 
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the volume of carbon emissions is adopted as the first proxy for carbon information asymmetry, 
from which the hypothesis is put forth as below: 
H1a: Firms with higher carbon emissions tend to adopt independent carbon assurance. 
Energy structure 
Carbon information asymmetry is influenced by the quantity of GHG emissions and is linked 
to the sources and types of energies and fuels used that generate the emissions, as the emissions 
factor6 varies across sources. For example, a firm may use a single source of fuel, such as coal, 
or it may use multiple types of energy, such as coal, gas, oil, bioenergy or other clean and 
renewable energies. Different types of energy and fuel produce different carbon emissions. The 
combustion of various types of fuel or the purchase of electricity, heat or cooling that is 
generated by different types of energy can complicate the measurement of fuel consumption 
and the conversion of fuel data into carbon emissions. The more different are the types of 
energy used by a firm, the more complex the process of carbon accounting, which aggravates 
inherent carbon information asymmetry. Thus, a firm that only consumes a single source of 
fuel, such as coal, or a firm that uses electricity that is generated by only a single source will 
have more straightforward carbon data than a firm that uses a mix of energy. Thus, the 
complexity of the energy structure is expected to positively relate to carbon information 
asymmetry. Therefore, the number of types of energy (fuel) used is chosen as the second proxy 
and form the following hypothesis: 
H1b: Firms with a more complex energy structure tend to adopt independent carbon assurance. 
Membership in a carbon-intensive sector 
The next proxy for carbon information asymmetry is related to a firm’s operation in a carbon-
intensive sector. Eng and Mak (2003) and Patten (1992) find that environmentally sensitive 
industries tend to have higher pollution and are targeted by environmental legislation 
(Baumert et al. 2005; Brammer and Pavelin 2006). Carbon information asymmetry is higher 
in GHG-intensive sectors, due to the impact of carbon legislation, which mainly targets 
carbon-intensive sectors and the outcomes of  the impacts are hard for outsiders to assess. For 
 
6 The emissions factor is a ratio that is applied in the calculation of carbon emissions. It represents the value of a 
given source of fuel/material/energy relative to units of activity or processes that are used to convert into GHG 




example, the American Power Act of 2010 was expected to significantly affect sectors with 
heavy emissions.7 Taxes and fees can be introduced to raise the direct costs of energy usage 
and to increase the indirect costs, such as compliance costs (Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004), for firms 
in energy-intensive sectors. It is difficult for outsiders to fully understand and assess the net 
effects of carbon legislation, rules and standards on the operation and profitability of these 
firms, even though these firms are subject to extensive scrutiny from the government, media 
and public. Thus, the third proxy for carbon information asymmetry is membership in a 
carbon-intensive sector, and the hypothesis is formalised as below: 
H1c: Firms with membership in a carbon-intensive sector tend to adopt independent carbon 
assurance. 
Based on the literature (Luo et al. 2012; Luo and Tang 2015; Tang and Luo 2014), this study 
considers energy, utilities and materials to be carbon-intensive sectors based on firm Global 
Industry Classification Standard codes. Energy firms exploit non-renewable resources (fossil 
fuel), and this takes a toll on the environment. Additionally, entities in the utilities and 
materials sectors are major consumers of energy and produce high GHG emissions (Simnett 
et al. 2009a). Companies in these industries have large emissions footprints and are subject to 
significant carbon legislation and regulations. The difficulty that outsiders have in evaluating 
the effects of these regulations on a firm’s business creates carbon information asymmetry. 
4.2.2 Carbon disclosure and carbon assurance 
Generally speaking, the current literature presents two theoretical assumptions regarding the 
role of carbon disclosure. The first view is that carbon disclosure faithfully reflects the 
underlying carbon emissions performance, corporate climate change policies and activities. 
This perspective can be termed the transparency assumption. For example, carbon disclosure 
can enhance transparency, so it may reduce the cost of capital and facilitate a reduction in any 
adverse effect GHG emissions may have on a firm’s value (Matsumura et al. 2014). Therefore, 
carbon disclosure reduces carbon information asymmetry. Under the carbon information 
asymmetry theory, the greater the carbon information asymmetry, the higher the likelihood of 
 
7 This bill sets steadily decreasing limitations on carbon emissions in energy-intensive industries. It includes 




the use of assurance. Thus, a negative association is expected between carbon disclosure and 
carbon assurance (H2a). 
The second view can be called the corporate veil assumption, which proposes that corporate 
disclosure does not reveal true environmental performance. Disclosure could be utilised by 
managers as a tool to legitimise their behaviour (Gray 2000) and achieve certain goals, such as 
creating a green image for and favourable impression among stakeholders (Cho et al. 2013; 
Deegan 2002). Hopwood (2009) argues that this disclosure may even reduce the understanding 
of a company and its environmental activities. When such strategies succeed, the legitimacy of 
the company will be less questioned; thus, the disclosure may, in fact, provide misleading or 
biased information. Thus, this is not only a problem of ‘doing the right thing for the wrong 
reason’ (Schaltegger and Burritt 2010), but of deliberately attempting to promote the positive 
side of a firm through a sustainability disclosure while hiding unsatisfactory performance in a 
self-congratulatory manner (Owen et al. 2001). In the spirit of this critical argument, the 
disclosure probably does more harm than good (Gray 2010; O’Donovan 2002). This disclosure 
may act as a veil (Hopwood 2009) that covers unpleasant truths or creates an artificial green 
identification (Clarkson et al. 2011).  
Globally, carbon disclosure remains a voluntary practice in most jurisdictions. For this reason, 
a number of researchers voice concerns regarding the credibility of this disclosure (e.g.,Haque 
and Deegan 2010; Stanny and Journal 2018; Kolk et al. 2008). Haslam et al. (2014) criticise 
the existing disclosures because they ‘generate malleable, inconsistent and irreconcilable 
numbers and narratives’. The shortcoming of corporate carbon disclosure is reflected in the gap 
in expectations amongst stakeholders and corporate managers (Haque et al. 2016; Lodhia et al. 
2012). Luo (2019) examines the relationship between the disclosure of carbon and carbon 
performance among Global 500 firms and indicates that legitimation is the primary purpose of 
carbon disclosure, and this motivation is more prevalent among firms with worse carbon 
reduction performance. Furthermore, there is a growing amount of anecdotal evidence that 
firms (e.g., carmakers and energy companies) misrepresent their true carbon performance in 
their carbon reporting, as well as its negative impact on climate change (Wasim 2019). These 
findings resonate with the critiques of previous authors, who tend to view voluntary disclosure 
as a ‘corporate veil’ (Gray 2010; Hopwood 2009) that can protect interior carbon-related 
information from outside scrutiny, which leads to increased information asymmetry despite the 
apparent openness with which it is reported. Under the theory of carbon information asymmetry, 
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the higher the carbon information asymmetry, the greater the likelihood of using carbon 
assurance. Thus, a positive correlation between disclosure score and carbon assurance is 
expected (H2b). Given the ambiguity in views on the role of carbon disclosure, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H2a: There is a negative relationship between disclosure score and carbon assurance. 
H2b: There is a positive relationship between disclosure score and carbon assurance. 
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The following figure shows the logic behind the relationship among carbon disclosure, carbon 
information asymmetry, and carbon assurance: 
 
Carbon Disclosure 
Is carbon disclosure expected 
to enhance transparency? 
 
Carbon information 
asymmetry is reduced   
Carbon information 
asymmetry is increased  
A negative relation between carbon 
disclosure and assurance (H2a) 
The use of carbon assurance is reduced  
(based on carbon information asymmetry theory 
[H1]) 
The use of carbon assurance is increased 
(based on carbon information asymmetry theory 
[H1])   
A positive relation between carbon 
disclosure and assurance (H2b) 
   Yes (Matsumura et al. 2014)    No (Gray 2010; Hopwood 2009) 
Figure 4. 1: Flow Chart of H2 
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4.3 Research Design 
4.3.1 Sample selection 
The carbon-related data employed within this study are obtained from the CDP database (CDP 
2011–2015). 8  The study period commences in 2011 because CDP information is only 
complete and consistent from that year, and CDP 2015 data are the latest available at the time 
this study was undertaken. Table 4.1 depicts the process of sample selection, beginning with 
firms in receipt of the CDP survey questionnaire (28,154 company-years). Then the sample is 
filtered by companies with an ‘Answered Questionnaire’ response status (participating 
companies). The sample is further limited to companies that allow complete information on 
their Scope 1 and Scope 2 carbon emissions to be publicly available. Next, these companies 
are combined with those in Datastream and Worldscope, where financial data are obtained. 
After this screening process, the final sample is 4,573 observations. We use CDP data because 
the CDP is the largest, most comprehensive and most consistent dataset on corporate carbon 
reporting, which is especially important due to the diversity of locations where disclosures are 
made. The CDP is also the source of data for many previous studies (Kolk et al. 2008; Stanny 
and Ely 2008; Reid and Toffel 2009; Stanny 2013; Matsumura et al. 2014). CDP collects 
carbon information from the largest listed companies around the world. Participation in the 
survey is voluntary, and companies’ responses are published by the CDP on its website. 
Finally, the CDP uses a standardised questionnaire that ensures comparable responses 
between entities, which is in contrast to sustainability or CSR reports, which are subject 
entirely to managers’ discretion. 
  
 



















from the CDP in 
CDP2011–CDP2015 
32,937 4,783 5,022 5,521 5,579 5,731 6,301 
Less those that did not 
respond 
19,372 2,734 2,886 3,258 3,249 3,387 3,858 
Less observations for 
which carbon information 
is not publicly available 
3,140 536 534 531 497 499 543 
Less observations with 
missing values for carbon 
information 
3,883 963 652 649 648 551 420 
Less observations with 
other missing control 
variables 
1,501 82 167 214 260 330 448 
Final Sample 5,041 468 783 869 925 964 1,032 
Firms with carbon 
assurance 
3,429 271 472 582 649 706 749 
Firms without carbon 
assurance 
1,612 197 311 287 276 258 283 
4.3.2 Research model 
4.3.2.1 Carbon information asymmetry and carbon assurance 
This empirical analysis investigates whether the proxies for carbon information asymmetry 
illustrate a significant association with the adoption of carbon assurance. The following three 
logistic regression models (Kolk and Perego 2010) with panel data are specified to test H1a, 
H1b and H1c: 
log [𝑃(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 = 1|𝑋 )/{1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 = 1|𝑋 )}] = 𝑋 𝛽, 
with 
𝑋 𝛽 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑖𝑛 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑛 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠





𝑋 𝛽 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑛
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(2) 
𝑋 𝛽 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐼𝑆 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑛 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(3) 
𝛽 𝐸𝑖𝑛 ,  in model (1) is replaced with 𝛽 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 ,  and 𝛽 𝐶𝐼𝑆 , , respectively, in models (2) 
and (3). 
Dependent and predictor variables 
The dependent variable 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈  equals 1 when firm i has its carbon emissions externally 
assured in year t and 0 otherwise. In models (1) to (3), each of the proxies is tested individually 
with the same control variables; all three proxies are included in model (4). Ein is a proxy for 
carbon information asymmetry and is measured as the total Scope 1 and 2 emissions in metric 
tons scaled by total sales in millions of dollars. H1a anticipates a positive sign for Ein. Fueltype 
is the firm’s energy structure and is measured as the number of fuel types. Firms are required 
to select their fuel/material/energy type from a list provided by CDP and to identify the 
emission factor used to convert the data of the source into carbon emissions9. More complex 
energy structures result in higher carbon information asymmetry, enhancing the probability of 
adopting assurance. CIS equates to 1 if the firm operates as part of the materials, utilities or 
energy sector based on its Global Industry Classification Standard code and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables 
The empirical model controls for the influence of other variables on assurance. First, firm size 
is controlled. According to social-political theory, large-sized firms are subject to more 
stringent stakeholder scrutiny and media coverage in comparison to smaller sized firms 
 
9 For example, the list of fuel/material/energy types in the 2017 CDP questionnaire includes the following: 
Aviation gasoline; Biodiesels; Biogas; Brown coal; Crude oil; Electricity; Natural gas; Patent fuel; Petroleum 






(Stanny and Ely 2008; Watts and Zimmerman 1990), and corporate carbon opacity may raise 
concerns about a firm’s impact on the climate. Therefore, there is an expectation that firm size 
is associated with carbon assurance. Firm size (SIZE) equals the natural logarithm of total 
sales. Likewise, profitability (ROA) is controlled, as more profitable firms tend to engage 
carbon assurance because the cost of assurance is affordable (Luo et al. 2013). Previous 
studies indicate that leverage is associated with CSR disclosure, so this effect is also controlled: 
LEV equals total debts to total assets ((Hay and Davis 2004; Clarkson et al. 2008). ENV is the 
environmental pillar score from the Thomson Reuters ESG Asset4 database, which is used as 
a proxy for firms’ environmental awareness. Capin is capital expenditure intensity, which is 
determined by dividing capital spending by total sales revenues at the end of the fiscal year. 
TobinQ is a proxy for financial performance to control for the influence of growth on carbon 
assurance (Clarkson et al. 2008). Further, STK represents the legal system; this dummy 
variable equals 1 if the firm is in a code law country and 0 otherwise (common law) 
(Archambault and Archambault 2003; Simnett et al. 2009b). ETS equals 1 if the firm is in a 
country with an operational ETS and 0 otherwise. ETS is controlled for the unhypothesised 
influences of a carbon-oriented institution in the firm’s business environment. Finally, year 
and country fixed effects are also controlled. To minimise any potential impacts of outliers, 
all continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. All definitions for variables 




Table 4. 2: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
ASSU A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has assured either 
Scope 1 or Scope 2 carbon emissions and 0 otherwise 
CDP 
Ein  A proxy for carbon emissions, calculated as the ratio of total Scope 
1 and Scope 2 emissions in metric tons to total sales in millions of 
dollars 
CDP, Worldscope 
Fueltype A proxy for the complexity of the firm’s energy structure, measured 
as the number of fuel types 
CDP 
CIS A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in a carbon-intensive 
sector (i.e., energy, materials, or utilities) and 0 otherwise 
CDP 
Disscore Carbon disclosure score (excluding the score for carbon assurance), 
based on the Climate Disclosure Leadership Index, which measures 
the quality of the company’s carbon disclosure to the CDP 
CDP 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets, representing the size of the 
company 
Worldscope 
ROA Return on assets, measured as net operating income divided by total 
assets at year end 
Worldscope  
LEV Leverage, computed as long-term debt scaled by total assets at year 
end 
Worldscope 
ENV An environmental score measuring the company’s impact on living 
and nonliving natural systems, including the air, land, water, and 
complete ecosystems, and reflecting how well the company uses 
best management practices to avoid environmental risk and 
capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long-term 
shareholder value 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4  
Capin Capital intensity, measured as capital spending divided by total 
sales revenues at the end of the fiscal year 
Worldscope 
TobinQ Total market value based on the year-end price and the number of 
shares outstanding, plus preferred shares, book value of long-term 
debt, and current liabilities, divided by book value of total assets 
Worldscope 
ETS A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in a country that has an 
operating national emissions trading scheme and 0 otherwise 
CDP 
STK A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is from a code law 
country and 0 if it is from a common law country 
La Porta et al. (1997) 
DISC A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm discloses its carbon 
information to the CDP and 0 otherwise 
CDP 
Disscore_Mean Mean industry disclosure score CDP 
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4.3.2.2 Carbon information asymmetry and carbon assurance 
To assess the role of carbon disclosure, Disscore is introduced to test the impacts of carbon 
disclosure on the adoption of carbon assurance. Disscore is taken as a proxy for carbon 
disclosure. It is calculated by CDP using the Climate Disclosure Leadership Index 
methodology. The awarded score increases with the completeness and breadth of the answers 
the firm provides to the CDP questionnaire. The CDP questionnaire covers an extensive 
breadth of information associate with climate change, including carbon targets and initiatives, 
climate risks and opportunities; carbon strategies and governance; carbon accounting 
methodology; Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions; energy consumption; climate initiatives; and 
engagement. Note that the disclosure score measures the comprehensiveness of carbon 
disclosure but not carbon reduction performance (Luo et al 2012).10 Model (4) is used to test 
H2a and H2b. Disscore may have a negative (H2a) or positive (H2b) coefficient. Model (5) 
includes all four main independent variables in a single model: 
log [𝑃(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 = 1|𝑋 )/{1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 = 1|𝑋 )}] = 𝑋 𝛽, 
with 
𝑋 𝛽 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑛
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(4) 
 
𝑋 𝛽 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑖𝑛 , + 𝛽 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐼𝑆 , + 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑛 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(5) 
 




4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.3 depicts the distribution of observations by country. The top five countries by number 
of observations engaging carbon assurance are the US (25.62% of total observations), the UK 
(16.47%), Japan (11.853%), France (7.54%) and Australia (5.51%). Table 4.4 indicates that 
the top sector for carbon assurance is industrials (19.16%), followed by financials (14.66%), 
consumer discretionary (11.68%), materials (11.11%) and consumer staples (9.69%). Table 
4.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in the study. The full sample comprises 
4,573 firm-year observations, including 3,158 (69.06%) that had GHG emissions assured and 
1,415 (30.94%) that did not. T-tests are also performed and it is found that firms that have 
their emissions assured tend to have a higher disclosure score, have higher carbon intensity, 
have a more complex energy structure, and belong to a carbon-intensive sector (i.e., energy, 
utilities or materials). In addition, firms that have their emissions assured are larger, are more 
profitable, and have better environmental performance than do firms that do not assure their 
emissions. All these results are consistent with the hypotheses and with prior studies regarding 
industry membership (Prado‐Lorenzo et al. 2009; Zhou et al. 2016), size (Haniffa and Cooke 





Table 4. 3: Distribution of Observations by Country 
  Full Sample  ASSU = 1  ASSU = 0 
Country  Na  %a  Nb  %b  Nc  %c 
 Australia  264  5.24  181  5.28  83  5.14 
 Austria  30  0.60  27  0.79  3  0.19 
 Belgium  43  0.85  36  1.05  7  0.43 
 Canada  319  6.33  160  4.67  159  9.85 
 Denmark  89  1.77  57  1.66  32  1.98 
 Finland  89  1.77  68  1.98  21  1.30 
 France  282  5.59  262  7.65  20  1.24 
 Germany  199  3.95  175  5.11  24  1.49 
 Ireland  53  1.05  38  1.11  15  0.93 
 Italy  109  2.16  102  2.98  7  0.43 
 Japan  641  12.72  391  11.41  250  15.49 
 Luxembourg  12  0.24  5  0.15  7  0.43 
 The Netherlands  72  1.43  56  1.63  16  0.99 
 New Zealand  23  0.46  13  0.38  10  0.62 
 Norway  66  1.31  51  1.49  15  0.93 
 Portugal  33  0.65  30  0.88  3  0.19 
 Spain  136  2.70  126  3.68  10  0.62 
 Sweden  146  2.90  81  2.36  65  4.03 
 Switzerland  158  3.13  108  3.15  50  3.10 
 United Kingdom  863  17.12  576  16.81  287  17.78 
 United States  1,414  28.05  884  25.80  530  32.84 
Total  5,041  100.00  3,427  100.00  1,614  100.00 
ASSU = 1 if the firm has its carbon emissions assured and 0 otherwise. 
%a is calculated as Na divided by the number of full sample (5,041). 
%b is calculated as Nb divided by the number of observations with carbon assurance (3,427). 
%c is calculated as Nc divided by the number of observations without carbon assurance (1,614). 
 
Table 4. 4: Descriptive Analyses—Industry Frequencies 
  Full Sample  ASSU = 1  ASSU = 0 
GICS Sector  Na  %a  Nb  %b  Nc  %c 
Communication Services  143  2.84  110  3.21  33  2.04 
Consumer Discretionary  680  13.49  400  11.67  280  17.35 
Consumer Staples  454  9.01  328  9.57  126  7.81 
Energy  310  6.15  224  6.54  86  5.33 
Financials  685  13.59  507  14.79  178  11.03 
Health Care  318  6.31  194  5.66  124  7.68 
Industrials  965  19.14  649  18.94  316  19.58 
Information Technology  460  9.13  253  7.38  207  12.83 
Materials  539  10.69  381  11.12  158  9.79 
Real Estate  212  4.21  149  4.35  63  3.90 
Utilities  275  5.46  232  6.77  43  2.66 
Total  5,041  100.00  3,427  100.00  1,614  100.00 
ASSU = 1 if the firm has its carbon emissions assured and 0 otherwise. 
%a is calculated as Na divided by the number of full sample (5,041). 
%b is calculated as Nb divided by the number of observations with carbon assurance (3,427). 




Table 4. 5: Descriptive Statistics for Assurance 
  Full Sample  ASSU=1  ASSU=0   
  (N=5,041)  (N=3,427)  (N=1,614)   
Variable  Mean   Medi
 
  SD  Mean   Medi
 
  SD  Mean   Medi
 
  SD  Mean Diff 
Ein  0.28  0.04  0.88  0.32  0.04  0.93  0.19  0.03  0.73  -0.128*** 
Fueltype  4.56  4.00  2.82  4.85  4.00  2.89  3.93  3.00  2.54  -0.923*** 
CIS  0.22  0.00  0.42  0.24  0.00  0.43  0.19  0.00  0.39  -0.053*** 
Disscore  80.70  83.28  15.27  84.99  88.76  13.91  71.12  72.00  13.76  -13.865*** 
SIZE   16.55  16.39  1.61  16.89  16.72  1.57  15.79  15.62  1.45  -1.103*** 
ROA  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.006*** 
LEV  115.93  62.55  182.50  130.05  69.61  194.32  84.43  50.89  148.17  -45.625*** 
ENV  78.42  87.31  20.01  81.94  89.21  16.97  70.56  79.66  23.72  -11.384*** 
Capin   0.09  0.04  0.12  0.09  0.04  0.12  0.09  0.04  0.13  0.084** 
TobinQ  1.61  1.29  0.95  1.55  1.26  0.86  1.74  1.38  1.10  0.185*** 
STK  0.58  1.00  0.49  0.54  1.00  0.50  0.67  1.00  0.47  0.128*** 
ETS    0.94   1.00   0.25   0.94   1.00   0.23   0.92   1.00   0.28   -0.029*** 





Table 4. 6: Correlation Matrix 
 ASSU Disscore  Ein Fueltype CIS SIZE  ROA LEV ENV Capin  TobinQ STK ETS 
ASSU  0.09* 0.16* 0.06* 0.44* 0.33* -0.06* 0.16* 0.25* 0.08* -0.10* -0.12* 0.05* 
Disscore  0.02  0.34* 0.60* 0.02 -0.09* 0.00 0.04* -0.00 0.61* -0.04* 0.06* -0.09* 
Ein 0.15* 0.03  0.14* 0.22* 0.19* 0.01 0.07* 0.25* 0.12* 0.01 -0.12* 0.02 
Fueltype 0.06* 0.05* 0.18*  0.01 0.01 -0.08* -0.00 -0.07* 0.42* -0.09* 0.02 -0.12* 
CIS 0.42* -0.02 0.20* -0.00  0.28* -0.05* 0.13* 0.21* 0.05* -0.01 -0.09* 0.13* 
SIZE  0.31* -0.03 0.14* -0.03* 0.26*  -0.29* 0.37* 0.32* -0.00 -0.32* -0.14* 0.09* 
ROA -0.04* -0.02 -0.01 -0.10* -0.03 -0.18*  -0.38* -0.08* 0.02 0.71* 0.26* 0.01 
LEV 0.04* -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.04* 0.10* -0.02  0.13* 0.07* -0.25* -0.12* 0.07* 
ENV 0.26* -0.03 0.23* -0.02 0.20* 0.30* -0.03* 0.02  -0.06* -0.10* -0.32* 0.15* 
Capin  -0.04* -0.00 -0.05* 0.09* -0.01 -0.06* -0.04* -0.01 -0.09*  -0.02 -0.02 -0.10* 
TobinQ -0.09* -0.01 -0.05* -0.12* -0.00 -0.29* 0.57* 0.00 -0.08* -0.01  0.28* 0.01 
STK -0.12* 0.02 -0.09* 0.02 -0.08* -0.14* 0.18* -0.03 -0.27* 0.03* 0.20*  -0.16* 
ETS 0.05* -0.05* 0.02 -0.12* 0.13* 0.08* 0.02 0.02 0.16* -0.09* 0.03* -0.16*  
This table presents correlations between variables used in multivariate tests of H1 and H2. Pearson correlation coefficients are below the diagonal, and Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
are above the diagonal. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 4.2. * p < 0.05 (two-tailed). 
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Table 4.6 presents Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal) 
correlations for results pooled for the sample years. The correlation between carbon 
intensity (Ein) and ASSU is significant and positive (Pearson coefficient = 0.07, p < 0.01; 
Spearman coefficient = 0.02, p < 0.01), which suggests that firms with higher carbon 
intensity are generally inclined to have their carbon information assured. Similarly, the 
relationships between ASSU and both Fueltype and CIS are significant and positive at the 
conventional level. These results do not contradict the argument that higher carbon 
information asymmetry incentivises managers to adopt voluntary carbon assurance. 
Overall, in examining the presence of any early signs of multicollinearity that might 
threaten the validity of the inferences (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007), I find that all the 
correlation coefficients are relatively low and no extreme correlations are present. 
Additionally, the variance inflation factor (VIF) value ranges from 1.22 to 1.90, indicating 
that multicollinearity not a serious issue in this study. 
4.4.2 Results of logistic regression 
4.4.2.1 Carbon information asymmetry and carbon assurance 
Table 4.7 presents the empirical results of logistic panel regression (with standard errors 
in parentheses) on the link between the proxies for carbon information asymmetry and 
assurance. H1a predicts that higher carbon intensity is linked with higher carbon 
information asymmetry, which triggers carbon assurance, and is supported by the positive 
and significant coefficients of Ein in models (1) and (5). The findings from models (2) 
and (5) indicate that the coefficients of Fueltype are positive and significant. This 
evidence is consistent with H1b—that the adoption of carbon assurance increases with the 
complexity of a firm’s energy structure. H1c is also confirmed with the positive and 
significant coefficients of CIS in both models (3) and (5), which implies that firms in 
carbon-intensive sectors are more likely to adopt carbon assurance. 
The interpretation of these results is that these proxies reflect different aspects of carbon 
information asymmetry. More specifically, the quantity of emissions captures the 
complexity of the entity’s organisational structure and is linked to multiple products 
manufactured with complex processing technology. This is one dimension of carbon 
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information asymmetry. The type of fuel used is another source of information asymmetry 
because it proxies for the extensiveness and sophistication of carbon accounting methods 
and protocols for energy consumption and GHG emissions. Finally, the knowledge gap 
related to the effect of government policy on business is a complex issue that varies across 
carbon-intensive and non-carbon-intensive sectors. The findings of statistical associations 
between these proxies and the adoption of carbon assurance enhance the understanding 
of how carbon information asymmetry drives the demand for expensive carbon assurance. 
Note that these variables (e.g., energy structure, industry membership) are predetermined 
factors for adoption of carbon assurance that is not subject to the direct control of the 
incumbent management.  
As for the control variables, firm size (SIZE) and profitability (ROA) have a significant 
and positive impact on the adoption of carbon assurance, whereas no significant results 
are found for legal system (STK), leverage (LEV) or capital expenditure intensity (Capin). 
The ability to manage environmental performance (ENV) facilitates the adoption of third-
party assurance of carbon information, which is expected. Finally, the effect of ETS on 




Table 4. 7: The Determinants of Carbon Assurance—Logistic Panel Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt 
Eint 0.484***    0.408*** 
 (0.161)    (0.155) 
Fueltypet  0.254***   0.151*** 
  (0.051)   (0.049) 
CISt   1.089***  0.568 
   (0.402)  (0.388) 
Disscoret    0.111*** 0.109*** 
    (0.008) (0.008) 
SIZEt 21.967*** 21.059*** 22.282*** 16.400*** 15.970*** 
 (2.013) (1.998) (2.031) (1.868) (1.851) 
ROAt 2.935* 2.754 2.814* 2.644 2.771* 
 (1.672) (1.681) (1.674) (1.651) (1.658) 
LEVt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ENVt 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Capint 2.992*** 3.717*** 2.639** 3.452*** 2.517** 
 (1.123) (1.116) (1.161) (1.043) (1.082) 
TobinQ -0.015 -0.032 -0.023 -0.029 0.015 
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.163) (0.153) (0.152) 
STKt 0.723 0.600 0.635 0.554 0.400 
 (1.071) (1.071) (1.073) (0.981) (0.979) 
ETSt -0.200 -0.262 -0.208 -0.185 -0.143 
 (0.403) (0.401) (0.402) (0.401) (0.403) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -64.344*** -62.283*** -65.173*** -55.259*** -54.589*** 
 (5.705) (5.663) (5.761) (5.304) (5.267) 
N 5,041 5,041 5,041 5,041 5,041 
χ² 328.58*** 330.17*** 326.40*** 390.35*** 394.46*** 
Coefficients are estimated with logistic panel regression for the full sample of 5,051 observations. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Definitions of variables are 




4.4.2.2 The role of carbon disclosure 
Column (4) in Table 4.7 details the results for the hypothesised impact of carbon 
disclosure on carbon assurance. Disscore has a positive coefficient at the 1% level of 
significance, which supports the hypothesis H2b. This implies that carbon disclosure 
might be used as a tool by managers to legitimise their behaviour and put a green image 
forward to the public, which is consistent with the arguments of Gray (2000) and 
Hopwood (2009). Such disclosure might provide biased or misleading information, rather 
than improving transparency (Hopwood 2009). As such, this may cause increased 
information asymmetry to prevail amongst managers and outside stakeholders, which 
eventually provokes the adoption of carbon assurance, as predicted by carbon information 
asymmetry theory.  
The results support the corporate veil assumption rather than the transparency 
assumption in regard to corporate carbon disclosure. In addition, the findings echo the 
growing literature in this field. For instance, Cowan and Deegan (2011) reveal that GHG 
disclosures rose after the enactment of the Australian National Pollutant Inventory, but the 
disclosures did not increase transparency. Instead, these disclosures simply legitimised 
reactions aiming at reducing the gap between public expectations and actual carbon 
performance. In other words, disclosure may not reflect the actual level of carbon 
performance. Recent studies confirm these findings. For example, Li et al. (2018) provide 
evidence that the chance of GHG disclosure by Chinese firms participating in the CDP is 
largely influenced by environmental legitimacy. Further, Luo (2019) reinforces the notion 
that carbon disclosure is adopted for legitimisation. It is also of importance to note that 
contrary to the three proxies (CO2, energy structure and sector membership), carbon 
disclosure is at the discretion of the incumbent directors. Overall, to the extent that 
carbon disclosure fails to reflect the underlying carbon performance, carbon assurance 
is demanded to help close the gap. Thus, the findings provide nuanced insight that sheds 
light on the dynamic interaction between carbon disclosure, carbon assurance and 
carbon information asymmetry. 
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4.4.3 Robustness tests 
To ensure the reliability of the results and correct for potential endogeneity, such as 
reverse causality or sample selection bias, further robustness checks for all five models 
are performed. First, an alternative model—pooled logistic regression— is used to re-
estimate all empirical models. The results presented in Table 4.8 are generally consistent 
with the baseline findings in Table 4.7. Second, a lead-lag approach (one-year lag of 
independent variables) is used to control for endogeneity and reverse causality. The 




Table 4. 8: The Determinants of Carbon Assurance—Pooled Logistic Regression of Panel Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt 
Eint 0.240***    0.258*** 
 (0.070)    (0.078) 
Fueltypet  0.112***   0.060*** 
  (0.017)   (0.017) 
CISt   0.295***  0.135 
   (0.095)  (0.118) 
Disscoret    0.073*** 0.073*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
SIZEt 8.376*** 7.950*** 8.363*** 6.446*** 6.305*** 
 (0.522) (0.521) (0.524) (0.576) (0.571) 
ROAt 1.268* 1.072 1.227* 1.371* 1.534** 
 (0.745) (0.723) (0.740) (0.765) (0.768) 
LEVt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ENVt 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Capint 1.119*** 1.532*** 1.086*** 1.500*** 1.024*** 
 (0.337) (0.336) (0.349) (0.387) (0.387) 
TobinQ 0.063 0.045 0.051 -0.004 0.018 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.057) (0.057) 
STKt 0.430 0.332 0.414 0.320 0.237 
 (0.283) (0.291) (0.287) (0.309) (0.307) 
ETSt -0.073 -0.111 -0.079 -0.161 -0.137 
 (0.209) (0.210) (0.211) (0.226) (0.222) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -24.657*** -23.598*** -24.556*** -23.605*** -23.481*** 
 (1.489) (1.482) (1.493) (1.608) (1.593) 
N 5,041 5,041 5,041 5,041 5,041 
% Correctly predicted 73.92% 73.77% 73.35% 77.88% 78.36% 
χ² 690.73*** 747.64*** 698.75*** 852.04*** 877.89*** 
Coefficients are estimated with pooled logistic regression with robust standard errors for the full sample 
of  5,051 observations. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. % correctly 
predicted shows the percentage that the models correctly predicted the outcome of carbon assurance 




Table 4. 9: The Determinants of Carbon Assurance—Logistic Panel Regression Lead-Lag Approach 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt 
Eint-1 0.621***    0.504*** 
 (0.192)    (0.181) 
Fueltypet-1  0.191***   0.104** 
  (0.052)   (0.049) 
CISt-1   1.128**  0.494 
   (0.470)  (0.437) 
Disscoret-1    0.104*** 0.103*** 
    (0.009) (0.009) 
SIZEt-1 23.088*** 22.072*** 23.227*** 17.094*** 16.765*** 
 (2.463) (2.439) (2.478) (2.158) (2.147) 
ROAt-1 6.626*** 6.617*** 6.473*** 6.118*** 6.276*** 
 (2.108) (2.101) (2.102) (2.017) (2.018) 
LEVt-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ENVt-1 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Capint-1 3.700*** 4.504*** 3.476** 4.394*** 3.255** 
 (1.403) (1.375) (1.446) (1.229) (1.276) 
TobinQt-1 0.022 -0.023 -0.006 -0.001 0.045 
 (0.200) (0.198) (0.199) (0.180) (0.180) 
STKt-1 1.516 1.407 1.461 1.066 0.892 
 (1.234) (1.214) (1.222) (1.088) (1.085) 
ETSt-1 -0.427 -0.448 -0.416 -0.586 -0.590 
 (0.509) (0.506) (0.506) (0.492) (0.494) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -66.881*** -64.424*** -67.218*** -56.042*** -55.502*** 
 (6.959) (6.886) (7.005) (6.114) (6.091) 
N 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689 3,689 
χ² 225.22*** 227.67*** 281.42*** 281.42*** 284.77*** 
Coefficients are estimated with logistic panel regression for the full sample of 3,689 observations. Standard errors 




Third, there may be endogeneity in the adoption of carbon assurance, as this study only 
includes firms that provide information to the CDP, which may indicate self-selection 
bias. To mitigate this concern, Heckman’s two-stage test is performed. In the first step, 
the sample is augmented by including firms that chose not to disclose to the CDP. Logistic 
panel regression is used at this stage: 
log [𝑃(𝐷𝑆𝐼𝐶 = 1|𝑋 )/{1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 = 1|𝑋 )}] = 𝑋 𝛽, 
with 
 𝑋 𝛽 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , + 𝛽 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐼𝑆 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑛 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀 
(6) 
where DISC is a dummy variable equating to 1 if the company chooses to disclose its 
carbon information to the CDP and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are selected 
following prior research related to carbon disclosure (Matsumura et al. 2014; Zhou et al. 
2016; Healy and Palepu 2001; Kwak et al. 2012). Firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), firm 
book-to-market ratio (BM), environmental performance (ENV) and profitability (ROA) 
are key variables that influence managers’ disclosure (Kwak et al. 2012; Zhou et al. 2016; 
Luo 2019). Moreover, following Stanny (2013), a lagged disclosure, DISCt-1, is employed 
to control for the company’s previous year’s disclosure to the CDP. It is found that 
companies that participate in CDP in the preceding year tend to disclose in the current 
year, as managers’ disclosure behaviour tends to be sticky. Therefore, a positive 
coefficient of DISCt-1 is expected. In addition, the mean industry disclosure score 
(Disscore_Mean) is included, which might also influence managers’ disclosure decision. 
In the second step, the logistic panel regression with models (1) to (5) are rerun. The 
results, shown in Table 4.10, are unchanged from the results in Tables 4.7, although for 




Table 4. 10: The Determinants of Carbon Assurance—Heckman’s Test 
Step 1: Selection Mode - Decision to Disclose to the CDP 
Step 2: Response Mode - Determinants of Adopting Carbon Assurance 
Step 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Selection Model DISCt DISCt DISCt DISCt DISCt 
DISCt-1 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.035 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Disscore_Meant  -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
CISt -0.233 -0.226 -0.229 -0.251 -0.249 
 (0.181) (0.180) (0.183) (0.179) (0.180) 
SIZEt  5.690*** 5.701*** 5.698*** 5.692*** 5.718*** 
 (0.484) (0.481) (0.484) (0.485) (0.479) 
ROAt  1.028*** 1.025*** 1.030*** 1.029*** 1.025*** 
 (0.397) (0.396) (0.396) (0.396) (0.396) 
LEVt  -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ENVt  0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capint 0.367 0.392 0.359 0.354 0.321 
 (0.286) (0.287) (0.285) (0.285) (0.277) 
TobinQ 0.156 0.158 0.155 0.153 0.153 
 (0.250) (0.249) (0.250) (0.250) (0.251) 
STKt -0.036 -0.037 -0.035 -0.037 -0.034 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
ETS 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.035 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -16.973*** -16.973*** -16.995*** -17.038*** -17.128*** 
 (1.552) (1.541) (1.554) (1.543) (1.526) 
χ2 1.63 2.37 1.14 0.71 0.35 
Step 2      
Response Model ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt ASSUt 
Eint 0.105*    0.126** 
 (0.058)    (0.061) 
Fueltypet  0.064***   0.039*** 
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  (0.015)   (0.014) 
CISt   0.144  0.071 
   (0.100)  (0.103) 
Disscoret    0.041*** 0.041*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
SIZEt 5.354*** 5.281*** 5.321*** 4.236*** 3.879*** 
 (0.571) (0.562) (0.601) (0.658) (0.556) 
ROAt 0.957* 0.880 0.925 0.957* 0.918 
 (0.577) (0.566) (0.579) (0.572) (0.577) 
LEVt 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ENVt 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Capint 0.775*** 0.964*** 0.767** 0.949*** 0.703** 
 (0.293) (0.295) (0.301) (0.316) (0.318) 
STKt 0.032 0.025 0.026 0.001 0.014 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.051) (0.052) 
ETSt 0.247 0.200 0.232 0.179 0.139 
 (0.254) (0.261) (0.258) (0.258) (0.260) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -16.230*** -16.280*** -16.061*** -15.428*** -14.311*** 
 (1.862) (1.827) (1.983) (2.125) (1.702) 
N 9,618 9,618 9,618 9,618 9,618 
Selected N 4,536 4,536 4,536 4,536 4,536 
Non-selected N 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 
Wald χ2 909.29 874.53 934.45 909.29 1,230.69 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -5839.281 -5820.479 -5844.987 -5,562.519 -5,545.418 
Definitions of variables are provided in Table 4.2. Coefficients are estimated with logistic panel regression for 




Finally, to address the further concern about reverse causality, Granger causality tests in 
panel datasets11 on carbon assurance and carbon information asymmetry are performed. 
The proxies for carbon information asymmetry are found to have a significant Granger 
causal relationship with carbon assurance, while the causality of assurance to carbon 
information asymmetry is not significant. Therefore, there is no reverse causal effect 
between carbon information asymmetry and carbon assurance. Taken as a whole, the 
results of the robustness tests are inferentially identical to the main findings, which 
provides further persuasive circumstantial evidence that substantiates and vindicates the 
accuracy of the models and corroborates the hypotheses. 
4.5 Conclusions 
There is a clear trend for investors to identify and consider a firm’s carbon-sensitive assets 
of a firm (Haigh and Shapiro 2011), and the quantity, format and venue of carbon 
disclosure are becoming relevant for their decision making (Hughes et al. 2001). 
Meanwhile, multiple regulated and unregulated reporting initiatives and frameworks 
abound around the world. For instance, the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Guidance for Disclosure Related to Climate Change outlines the conditions for public 
companies’ disclosure of material information related to climate-associated risks and 
opportunities. More recently, it has become mandatory for listed UK companies to 
disclose carbon information in their annual directors’ report.12 
In this context, this study focuses on how carbon assurance is linked with carbon 
information asymmetry. The results show that the three proxies adopted in this study 
capture different aspects of carbon information asymmetry. First, the quantity of 
emissions is associated with the complexity of the organisational structure, nature of the 
products and unique manufacturing processing. Second, carbon information asymmetry 
 
11 The Granger causality test was originally designed for pairs of lengthy time series; however, it has recently 
been modified to incorporate panel dynamics. The extension of the original Granger methodology to panel 
data has the potential to improve upon the conventional Granger analysis for all of the reasons that panel 
analysis is generally preferable to cross-sectional or traditional time series analysis (see see Greene 2003, 
308308). 
 




is linked with the sophisticated technical carbon accounting protocols13 used to quantify 
different types of energy sources that convert energy consumption to emissions. Thus, 
information asymmetry increases with the type of energy consumed. Finally, carbon 
information asymmetry is higher in a carbon-intensive sector with regard to the complex 
impact of government-imposed regulations on firm operation. With these novel proxies, 
the findings depict the overall corporate carbon information gap and demonstrate its 
unexplored consequence on carbon assurance. The results show that the coefficients of 
these variables retain their positive signs across all test models, and further analyses yield 
similar findings. Thus, this study provides evidence on the sensitivity of a specific carbon 
initiative—carbon assurance—to different dimensions and levels of carbon information 
asymmetry. Further, the findings unfold the channels (such as enhanced credibility and 
reduced transaction costs) through which prioritising external assurance generates value. 
Thus, this study validates and increases the applicability of information asymmetry theory 
in the context of climate change in a significant manner. 
The in-depth empirical analyses discover a subtle distinction between carbon assurance 
and financial assurance in terms of their ability to inform stakeholders who care about firms’ 
financial and nonfinancial performance. Through drawing on information asymmetry 
economics (Myers and Read 2001), and based on the fact that managers tend to use private 
informed data to contextualise their carbon performance and camouflage their inferior 
carbon policy, a direct inference from this study is that carbon assurance can enhance value 
(by reducing transaction costs), conditional on the severity of the carbon knowledge gap 
among the key stakeholders of a firm (Schiemann and Sakhel 2019). 
However, the practice of carbon assurance is still in its early stage and is subsequently 
imperfect. Thus, the results are useful for regulators and accounting practitioners to take 
actions to improve the practice. Currently available guidelines for carbon assurance 
 
13 For example, Publicly Available Specification (PAS) 2050 published by the British Standards Institution 
(BSI), GHG Protocol Product Standard (GHG Protocol) convened by the World Resources Institute (WRI), 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and ISO 14067 Carbon Footprint of 
Products (ISO 14067) provided by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), etc. Although 
the general principles of the above mentioned protocols are the same, the different criteria provided may lead 
to numerical differences in carbon footprint due to the inconsistency originate from the system boundary, 
cut-off criteria, biogenic carbon treatment, allocation, and other requirements. 
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originate from very different professional imperatives (IAASB 2012) (GRI, etc.). 
Assurers adopt different investigative procedures, ethical standards and independence 
requirements, some of which are proprietary (Deegan and Blomquist 2006). The diversity 
of methodologies, strategies and practitioners increases the complexity of assurance 
(Scalet and Kelly 2010; Waddock 2008; Simnett et al. 2009a). Thus, a set of legally 
enforceable principles or norms should be implemented to regulate this emerging market 
and practice. The fact that these firms purchased GHG assurance in addition to assurance 
of financial statements implies that carbon information asymmetry is a distinct dimension 
of information asymmetry concerning the authenticity of carbon information. Thus, 
governmental and professional bodies need to consider whether carbon assurance should 
be made compulsory. 
It is acknowledged that this study has several limitations. First, only large listed firms are 
considered in the research design, thus it is wise to exercise caution when applying the 
results to small or unlisted firms. Second, the sample is only inclusive of firms that 
participate in the CDP, other ways that firms may choose to disclose their GHG 
information (e.g., sustainability statements) are not considered. Finally, as alluded to 
earlier, although there are concerns about the assurance methodology used, this research 
does not examine how the assurance is conducted by different assurance providers (e.g., 
accounting firms or consultant firms). This is left to future studies. 
To extend the study, future researchers may explore the causal effects of information 
asymmetry on assurance in different contexts. The unregulated carbon assurance market 
is still in its infancy, yet is quickly evolving into a sophisticated, specialised and 
competitive market (Green and Li 2011). However, little is known about how practitioners 
implement GHG assurance standards in practice, which is worth future research. In 
addition, it is important to explore how carbon assurance can help firms improve carbon 
reduction performance, carbon management systems, and corporate carbon governance. 
Moreover, the relationship between firm value and carbon performance, including carbon 
reduction activities and assurance, is a promising area of investigation. Finally, 
accounting students need to be equipped with adequate knowledge of how to implement 
new accounting and assurance standards for GHG statements. Thus, it is necessary for 
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university accounting faculties to develop teaching materials for future generations of 













CHAPTER 5 CARBON ASSURANCE AND CARBON DISCLOSURE 
5.1 Introduction 
Growing concern about the intense global warming (Stern et al. 2007) has enhanced the 
pressure on firms to set carbon reduction targets and undertake initiatives to mitigate 
carbon emissions (Romar 2009; Galbreath 2011; Depoers et al. 2016; Ioannou and 
Serafeim 2017). A wide range of stakeholders increasingly require firms to disclose carbon 
information for their decision making (Matsumura et al. 2014; Griffin et al. 2017). 
However, many studies criticize the quality and reliability of voluntarily disclosed 
information (Freedman and Jaggi 2005; Stanny and Ely 2008; Reid and Toffel 2009; Lyon 
and Maxwell 2011; Gouldson and Sullivan 2007; Doda et al. 2016). Consequently, strong 
demand is emerging for independent verification of reports on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
(GHG; Green and Li 2011; Luo and Tang 2014; Zhou et al. 2016; Becker et al. 1998; De 
Beelde and Tuybens 2015; Francis and Schipper 1999; Francis 2004; Hay and Davis 2004; 
Watts and Zimmerman 1990) 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change). Although carbon 
assurance is an extension of financial assurance, many nuances distinguish the two (see 
Table 5.1). Moreover, carbon assurance also differs from conventional CSR/sustainability 
assurance. First, carbon assurance focuses only on the carbon-related issues while CSR 
assurance covers general social and environmental issues. Second, carbon assurance entails 
specialized climate knowledge and expertise, and the service is often provided not only by 
accounting firms but also by consulting firms (non-accountants) and the audit team usually 
includes energy experts, engineers and chemists (IAASB 2012). Third, the risks of 
misstatement in a GHG statement involved factors that differ from those that are associated 
with CSR assurance. The accuracy of measurement of carbon emissions is influenced by 
scientific, regulatory, and physical factors. It is also affected by energy structure, degree of 
complexity of operations and the nature of business (ISAE 3410). Thus, carbon assurer 
must assess the adequateness of internal controls for emissions (ISAE 3410, 33R, para. 
A79–A80) and check these factors that can increase misstatement, e.g., duplicate counting; 
omission of a significant category of emissions, such as scope 3 emissions (fugitive 
emissions); abnormal emissions (ISAE 3410, para. A88 (a), (e), (f)); misclassification of 
emissions sources and unrealistic, biased judgements or estimates (ISAE 3410, para. A88 
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(g)). Hence, given the uniqueness of this practice, carbon assurance deserves its own 
analysis and it comprises a significant part of the business of the accounting profession 
(Simnett et al. 2009b). Yet researchers’ understanding of this new type of assurance is very 
limited given the scarcity of literature in this area (KPMG 2015). This study fills this void 
by examining the effect of assurance on carbon disclosure. These insights have not been 
documented in the literature. 




Financial Reporting and Auditing 
Characteristics in Developed Nations 




Complex accounting and auditing skills 
are required, with certifications such as 
Certified Public Accountant necessary, 
and skills are well developed as part of 
broad professional services offered by 
numerous firms at the global and local 
levels. Documentation requirements from 
non-accounting competencies in areas 
such as facilities, engineering, supply 
chain operations, and others are fully 
established to give credibility to such 
things as the financial value of raw 
materials or finished goods inventory. 
There are no global standards for the 
competencies required to either report on 
or assure GHG reporting, which has 
given rise to the large number of firms 
claiming to provide this service. Some 
jurisdictions that require accreditation, 
such as California in the United States, 
have already begun to address this issue. 
Required skills include a mix of 
accounting, environmental, and 
operational knowledge and (in the case 
of multinational organizations) global 




Assures investors and other stakeholders 
of financial strength, controls to protect 
against fraud, and accountability for 
anomalous information 
 
Assures investors, suppliers, customers, 
and other stakeholders of environmental 
impact improvements, confidence in 
making sound operational decisions, and 
support for environmentally 




Poorly done audits can result in 
undetected fraud, misleading information, 
and loss of investor confidence, with the 
potential for fines and criminal 
prosecution for systematic and pervasive 
problems. 
 
The wide range of firms claiming to 
assure reported data can lead to great 
variance in the quality of assurance 
opinions. In some cases, the opinion may 
be nothing more than a management 
letter suggesting improvements. There is 
a risk that uneducated readers may rely 
more on a third-party assurance than is 
warranted by the quality of the report. 
This table is excerpted from Olson (2017). GHG = greenhouse gas. 
Prior studies have mainly focused on the incentives for voluntary adoption of carbon 
assurance (Zhou et al. 2016; Green and Zhou 2013; Datt et al. 2018; Datt et al. 2018a; Datt 
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et al. 2018b), choice of assurance provider (Huggins et al. 2011; Green and Taylor 2013), 
the role of internal auditors in GHG reporting (Trotman and Trotman 2013), the expertise 
required for GHG assurance (Green and Li 2011), the development of an international 
standard for GHG assurance (Cohen and Simnett 2014). However, while carbon assurance 
is expected to impact users’ perceptions, there is limited knowledge on the effect of carbon 
assurance on disclosure.  
Based on stakeholder engagement theory (Edgley et al. 2010), it is argued that assurance 
of carbon reports may improve their clients’ reporting systems so as to lead to a better 
future carbon disclosure. The underlying rationale is that, first, a firm engages carbon 
assurer to verify its information on emissions. Such engagement helps the firm understands 
the needs of external stakeholders for carbon-related information. Second, on completion 
of assurance, an auditor usually provides managers with a letter containing 
recommendations for fixing flaws in internal control and current reporting systems (Gay 
and Simnett 2018). Managers may subsequently use these recommendations to prepare 
their future carbon reports. This interactive mechanism is expected to have a positive 
impact on firms’ future carbon disclosure.  
The sample comprises a cohort of the largest listed companies in the world that participated 
in the CDP (previously the Carbon Disclosure Project) survey from 2010 to 2015. The 
comprehensiveness of disclosure is measured using the CDP’s Climate Disclosure 
Leadership Index (CDLI). The empirical evidence supports the theoretical predictions and 
shows that subsequent carbon disclosure is significantly higher among assured companies 
than unassured companies. The results are consistent with prior literature (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990; Francis 2004; Hay and Davis 2004; Kolk and Perego 2010; Adams and 
Evans 2004; O'Dwyer and Owen 2005; Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Huggins et al. 2011; 
Cohen and Simnett 2014) in the sense that auditing is not only essential to enhancing the 
credibility in the eyes of external users, but also helps the internal process for the 
preparation of environmental reports. In addition, it is found that this relationship is more 
pronounced in stakeholder-oriented countries, in countries with an emissions trading 
scheme (ETS), and in carbon-intensive sectors (CISs), which further supports the 
stakeholder engagement argument. 
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This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, contrary to previous 
studies on sustainability (Casey and Grenier 2014), this study focuses solely on carbon 
assurance as performing carbon assurance requires specific skills, knowledge, and 
expertise and is governed by separate standards (IAASB 2012; Tang 2019; Datt et al. 2018; 
Datt et al. 2018b) and methods used by firms for controlling risk and examining GHG 
emissions in carbon assurance are expected to differ significantly from methods used in 
conventional financial auditing. Thus, carbon assurance is an important dimension in 
carbon accounting and it is distinct from sustainability assurance, which deserves a separate 
study. Second, to my knowledge, this study is the first to provide empirical evidence of the 
role of carbon assurance in enhancing carbon disclosure. Third, this study enhances the 
understanding of the role of the institutional context in carbon disclosure and assurance. 
There is no research on how these industrial and national factors moderate the link between 
carbon assurance and carbon disclosure. Last, Edgley et al. (2010) show the importance of 
stakeholder engagement in environmental assurance. The findings reinforce the validity 
and appropriateness of this concept in the carbon assurance practice. The evidence should 
assist assurance practitioners, regulators, and users of carbon reports in obtaining a better 
knowledge of this indispensable practice in today’s low-carbon economy.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the research background 
and hypotheses of the study. The data and methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 
4 reports and discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 summarizes the main findings 
and the implications of the study for future research. 
5.2 Hypotheses Development 
5.2.1 Carbon assurance and carbon disclosure 
Prior literature suggests that the adoption of sustainability assurance can be perceived as a 
dialogical process, being stakeholder inclusive and transformative (Edgley et al. (2010). 
This approach allows assurers to directly (e.g. face to face interview) or indirect (e.g. via 
media conference) communicate with clients, users, managers, and staff of the auditee and 
enhance the ability to interact with both the outside stakeholders and the internal members 
during decision-making processes (Gray 2000; Owen et al. 2000; Manetti and Toccafondi 
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2012). Thus, external auditors may assist managers in identifying carbon-related risks and 
opportunities, assess the costs and benefits of long-term green investment, set reasonable 
carbon reduction targets, evaluate carbon performance, and so on. It can be argued that 
stakeholder-inclusive assurance has a positive impact on subsequent carbon reporting. The 
rationale is articulated in the following discussion.   
First, assurers who adopt a stakeholder inclusivity approach understand better the needs of 
external stakeholders for carbon-related information particularly when an auditing firm’s 
network comprises multifaceted clients (Edgley et al. 2010). Thus, such assurance 
engagement involves greater interaction with external stakeholders, therefore ensuring that 
social and environmental reporting is responsive, complete and satisfies stakeholders’ need 
for information (Edgley et al. 2010; Thomson and Bebbington 2005; Owen et al. 2000).  
These auditors are able to raise critical consciousness of environmental reporting rather 
than just passively and unquestioningly accept information (Edgley et al. 2010) and their 
opinions reflect the demand of users for information on physical emissions, carbon risks, 
carbon strategy and investment, and so on. Assurer can help managers select appropriate 
information and determine the scope and depth of this disclosure, thus, the underlying GHG 
report can be made more relevant and comprehensive. 
Second, assurance activities are likely to strengthen a client’s internal system (Baker and 
Owsen 2002; Elliott 1994). According to the authoritative guidelines (e.g. GRI, ISAE 
3410), auditors need to identify deficiencies and recommend improvements to a company’s 
environmental management systems (Deegan et al. 2006; Moroney et al. 2012). 
Stakeholder inclusivity allows assurers to work closely with clients to evaluate the strength 
of internal systems, test the validity of outputs, detect risk, and identify misstatements due 
to poor process design and/or inadequate controls (Olson 2010). Although an auditor is not 
expected to design control measures, the auditor is able to recommend or suggest broader 
options for how the auditee can improve the system for future reporting purposes. This is 
evident in the research of Manetti and Toccafondi (2012), who find that the majority of 
assurance statements they analyzed included consultation from stakeholders in the 
formulation of assurers’ professional opinions, which is a common practice (Gay and 
Simnett 2018; Olson 2010). 
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Third, auditors often maintain contact with clients to make them aware of changes in 
reporting protocols or associated legislation throughout the auditing. Auditors may also 
inform clients of the changing demands of other stakeholders, such as the community, 
supply chain partners, employees, and not-for-profit organizations, during or after the 
current auditing period. This will ultimately reflect in improved carbon reporting. As 
discussed by Moroney et al. (2012), the benefit of such assurance is lagged. It gradually 
influences managers’ behavior and serves as a learning process for managers and 
stakeholders (Edgley et al. 2010). Thus, I propose the first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between carbon assurance and subsequent 
carbon disclosure. 
5.2.2 The influence of institutional context  
Next, the influence of carbon institutions (e.g., norms, standards, regulations, or accepted 
practices) on the link between assurance and disclosure is examined. Prior studies argue 
that a country’s institutional context, such as the civil law environment and legal 
enforcement, impacts firms’ sustainability strategies (Kolk and Perego (2010); Chen and 
Bouvain (2009), and CSR disclosure (e.g.,  García-Sánchez et al. 2016). Martínez-Ferrero 
and García-Sánchez (2017) show that voluntary assurance of sustainability reports derives 
from coercive, normative, and mimetic forces related to legal and cultural strength and 
industry pressure for assurance. Luo (2019) find that three carbon-regulated institutional 
factors—namely, a stakeholder orientation culture, the existence of a national ETS, and 
affiliation with a CIS—have impacts on carbon control practices. 
5.2.2.1 Stakeholder versus shareholder orientation 
The difference between common law and code law systems is acknowledged as a valid 
proxy for the extent of the market relative to the political determination of corporate 
reporting (Ball et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1997). Briefly stated, in common law countries, 
a so-called shareholder model (as opposed to a stakeholder model) or contractarian system 
prevails in which maximization of shareholder wealth is the primary purpose of business 
and the role of other stakeholder groups is less emphasized. Thus, firms tend to deal with 
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investors at arm’s length, and increased demand for information on financial performance 
is expected (Jaggi and Low 2000). A communitarian system with a stakeholder orientation 
is more likely to be adopted in a code law country, where an organization has social 
responsibilities beyond merely achieving economic efficiency, and such responsibilities 
are not only to their shareholders but to all stakeholders. This leads to the expectation that 
firms in these countries show higher environmental and social reporting (Tang and Luo 
2016; Dawkins and Fraas 2011; Reid and Toffel 2009; Van der Laan Smith et al. 2005) 
and sustainability assurance (Kolk and Perego (2010). In a similar vein, Zhou et al. (2016) 
reveal greater demand for carbon assurance in stakeholder-oriented countries and found 
that this assurance may substitute for weaker legal enforcement in the monitoring of 
corporate climate change activities. In the context, people with stakeholder orientation have 
a higher expectation of socially responsible behavior. Thus, it is predicted that firms in 
stakeholder-oriented nations are more likely to engage independent assurers in their 
decisions to disclose, and stakeholders expect auditors to assist managers to improve 
carbon transparency. This institutional arrangement encourages greater cooperation and 
interaction between auditors and auditees on carbon reporting issues. This argument is 
consistent with prior literature (Zhou et al. 2016) that finds that carbon assurance may play 
a larger role in stakeholder-oriented countries in the absence of robust legal institutions. 
This discussion leads to formalize the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Carbon assurance has a stronger impact on carbon disclosure in countries 
with a tendency toward stakeholder protection.  
5.2.2.2 ETS 
The carbon-specific regulation is another component of the institutional context (Huggins 
et al. 2011; World Bank 2014; Zhou et al. 2016). Because of strong political resistance and 
companies’ reluctance to support regulatory policies (e.g., carbon tax), an ETS (also 
referred to as a cap and trade system) is often seen as a favorable policy instrument. The 
decentralized and competitive nature of an ETS provides flexibility and enables cost-
effective carbon reduction. Under an ETS, emissions are commercialized, which 
internalizes an otherwise external environmental cost that can transcend the tense 
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relationship between economic development and climate stabilization. Operating a carbon 
market (ETS) requires higher standards for carbon monitoring, measurement and reporting 
(Luo et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2013; Luo 2019). Therefore, investors and stakeholders have a 
greater demand for verified carbon information. Thus, it can be argued that the effects of 
carbon assurance on disclosure will be strengthened in an ETS setting.  
Hypothesis 2b: The existence of an ETS enhances the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and carbon assurance. 
5.2.2.3 CIS 
Materials, energy, and utilities are identified as CISs (Tang and Luo 2016)14 and these 
sectors represent 26.2%, 28.3%, and 33.3% of total reported Scope 1 and 2 emissions of 
Global 500 companies, respectively (CDP (2012). Carbon-intensive companies undergo 
intense scrutiny and are regulated under stringent legislation. Managers likely have 
stronger incentives to engage external stakeholders, including assurance providers, to 
improve carbon disclosure (Mock et al. 2007). Therefore, it can be argued that carbon 
assurance probably becomes an institutionalized practice in such environmentally sensitive 
sectors and carbon assurers can build more expertise and competence and are able to assist 
managers in their carbon reporting capacity. For all of these reasons, the effect of carbon 
assurance is expected to be stronger for companies in carbon-intensive compared to those 
in non-intensive industries. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2c: Affiliation with a CIS moderates the relationship between carbon 
disclosure and assurance. 
5.3 Research Design 
5.3.1 Sample selection 
The sample for this study is extracted from the CDP database. CDP is an independent not-
for-profit organization that collects information related to GHG of the largest listed 
 




companies in the world using a standardized questionnaire. Although participation in the 
survey is up to managerial discretion, the CDP provides comprehensive and consistent data 
used in many prior studies (Kolk et al. 2008; Stanny and Ely 2008; Reid and Toffel 2009; 
Stanny 2013; Matsumura et al. 2014). The sample period (2010–2015) covers the most 
recent data available at the time of this study. Sample selection commences in 2010 because 
CDP assurance information only became complete in 2010. Table 5.2 shows the sample 
selection process begins with all companies that received the CDP survey request (32,937 
company-years). Then I filter the companies with an “Answered Questionnaire” response 
status (i.e., participating companies) and limit the sample to companies that disclosed in 
publicly available reports with quantified Scope 1 and 2 emissions 15 Next, these companies 
are merged with those in the database of Worldscope and Datastream, from which I obtain 
the financial data required for the study. This process results in a final sample of 6,056 
observations of Scope 1 or Scope 2 assurance (of which 5,749 is Scope 1 assurance and 
5,856 is Scope 2 assurance).  
Table 5. 2: Sample Selection 
Received questionnaire from CDP for 2010–2015 32,937 
Less those not responding  (19,372) 
Less observations in which carbon information was not disclosed publicly and 
          
(6,606)  
Less observations with missing values for control variables (903)  
Observations with carbon assurance for analysis 6056 
No. of observations involving Scope 1 assurance 5,749 
No. of observations involving Scope 2 assurance 5,856 
 
5.3.2 Model specification 
5.3.2.1 The measurement of carbon disclosure 
In this study, comprehensiveness of carbon disclosure is measured as an index (0-100) 
scored per CDP disclosure rating guidelines (CDP 2016) based on the firm’s responses to 
the questionnaire (Lee et al. (2015). According to the guidelines (refers to CDLI 
 
15 Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from sources owned or controlled by the entity. Scope 2 emissions 
are indirect emissions associated with energy that is transferred to and consumed by the entity. Scope 3 
emissions are emissions from employee business travel, external distribution/logistics, disposal of products 




methodology), companies are awarded more points if they disclose more relevant and 
quantitative information with specific case examples (Cotter and Najah 2012). The 
methodology also takes into account the importance and materiality of specific climate 
change information. For example, 6 points are given to companies that report gross Scope 
1 or 2 GHG data, because these data are very important for assessing exposure to climate 
risk. The carbon disclosure score of a firm is calculated as the total points awarded divided 
by the total possible points multiplied by 10016.  The awarded score increases with the 
degree of comprehensiveness of carbon disclosure; a high score indicates that executives 
are responsive to stakeholders to provide carbon performance data. Note the score for 
assurance is excluded from the overall score in this study to avoid a mechanical relationship 
between the assurance and disclosure scores. 
Using the CDLI as a proxy has specific advantages because participating companies follow 
the single standardized survey format, and procedures for data collection, reporting, and 
rating are consistent for all companies; thus, analysis, contrast and comparisons of the data 
are made meaningful. According to a 2013 survey conducted by GlobeScan and 
SustainAbility, the CDP disclosure index had the highest credibility of all sustainability 
ratings and rankings surveyed  (SustainAbility 2013). In summary, in the absence of 
internationally recognized carbon reporting protocol, corporate disclosure to CDP is 
globally consistent, which allows for a straightforward interpretation of results and 
increases the power of the statistical tests in the study. 
5.3.2.2 The measurement of carbon institutional context 
Regarding a shareholder versus stakeholder orientation (Van der Laan Smith et al. 2005; 
Etzion 2007; Simnett et al. 2009b), a firm that is domiciled in a common (civil) law country 
is considered to have a shareholder (stakeholder) orientation (Porta et al. 1998; Jaggi and 
Low 2000; Archambault and Archambault 2003). STK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm is in a stakeholder-oriented country and 0 otherwise. The variable ETS equals 1 if 
the firm is in a country with a national ETS and 0 otherwise. Finally, following Luo (2019), 
 
16 A firm must answer all applicable questions; questions left blank reduce the number of points awarded. 
However, firms are not penalized for not answering questions that do not apply to them. See the CDP Scoring 
Methodology (2016) for more details. 
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I introduce the dummy variable CIS, which equals 1 if the firm is in a CIS and 0 otherwise 
(see Table 5.3).  
5.3.2.3 Empirical models 
Comprehensiveness of carbon disclosure and carbon assurance 
As the effects of carbon assurance on carbon disclosure are expected to be lagged, instead 
of using a contemporaneous method, I adopt a lead-lag model to test the first hypothesis: 
𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(1) 
𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(2) 
𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(3) 
The dependent variable D_SCORE is the carbon disclosure score excluding the score for 
carbon assurance. S1_ASSU (S2_ASSU) is coded 1 for assurance of Scope 1 (Scope 2) 
emissions and 0 otherwise. ASSU is coded 1 for assurance of either Scope 1 or Scope 2 
emissions and 0 otherwise. It is expected that β1 is positive (Hypothesis 1).  
I consider the following control variables (Luo 2019). CEI represents the intensity of 
carbon emissions. It is measured as total Scope 1 and Scope 2 carbon emissions divided by 
total sales. Compared to absolute carbon emissions, the intensity of carbon emissions takes 
into account the level of output of products and services, which produces more reasonable 
comparisons across companies and reporting periods (Hoffman 2007). Companies with 
higher carbon emissions tend to disclose more, as greater emissions are subject to more 
carbon regulations and public attention. lnTA stands for firm size, measured as the natural 
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logarithm of the company’s total assets. Larger companies are expected to report more 
carbon information (Cormier et al. 2005; Gray and Bebbington 2001; Jones and Levy 2007). 
LEV is the leverage ratio, which equals total debts divided by total assets. Preliminary 
evidence suggests that firm risk is positively associated with environmental responsibility 
(Hill and Jones 1992). ENV is an environmental score measuring a company’s impact on 
living and nonliving natural systems. It is obtained from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 
Database (Cheng et al. 2014). A positive coefficient is expected for ENV.17 ROA is return 
on assets. Clarkson et al. (2011) use the intensity of research and development (RDIN), 
measured as research and development expenses divided by total assets, as a proxy for 
unobservable management talent or capability (Murphy 1999), which may link to better 
carbon disclosure. Finally, Tobin’s Q is used as an indicator of the degree of information 
asymmetry. I expect a positive correlation between TOBINQ and carbon disclosure 




17 The reason we include both CEI and ENV is that carbon emissions might be capturing the effect of a firm’s 
general environmental performance. We also conducted a robustness test by excluding this variable in our 
main model, the results are qualitatively the same and our inferences still sustain. 
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Table 5. 3: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
D_SCORE Carbon disclosure score, based on the Climate Disclosure Leadership Index (CDLI) 
methodology, which measures the quality of the company’s carbon disclosure to CDP.  
CDP 
S1_ASSU A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has assured Scope 1 carbon emissions and 0 
otherwise. 
CDP 
 S2_ASSU A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has assured Scope 2 carbon emissions and 0 
otherwise. 
CDP 
 ASSU A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has assured either Scope 1 or Scope 2 carbon 
emissions and 0 otherwise. 
CDP 
CEI  Intensity of carbon emissions, calculated as total carbon emissions divided by total sales. CDP, Worldscope 
lnTA Natural logarithm of total assets, representing the size of the company. Worldscope 
LEV Leverage ratio, computed as long-term debt scaled by total assets at year end. Worldscope 
ENV Environmental score measuring the company’s impact on living and nonliving natural 
systems, including the air, land, water, and complete ecosystems, and reflecting how well 
the company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risk and capitalize on 
environmental opportunities to generate long-term shareholder value. 
ASSET4  
 
ROA Return on assets, measured as net operating income divided by total assets at year end. Worldscope  
RDIN Intensity of research and development, measured as research and development expenses 
divided by total assets at the beginning of the period. 
Worldscope 
TOBINQ Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of common equity plus the book value of 
preferred stock and the book value of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by the 
book value of total assets. 
Datastream 
STK A dummy variable coded 1 if the responding company is from a code law country and 0 if 
it is from a common law country. 
La Porta et al. 
(1997) 
ETS A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in a country that has an operating national 
emissions trading scheme and 0 otherwise. 
CDP 
CIS A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in a carbon-intensive sector (i.e., energy, 
materials, or utilities) and 0 otherwise. 
CDP 
S1_ASSUCOVER Level of assurance of Scope 1 emissions, classified into five categories: less than 20%, 
21%–40%, 41%–60%, 61%–80%, or 81%–100%, coded as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
CDP 
S2_ASSUCOVER Level of assurance of Scope 2 emissions, classified into five categories: less than 20%, 
21%–40%, 41%–60%, 61%–80%, or 81%–100%, coded as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
CDP 
BM The firm’s book-to-market ratio. Worldscope 
DISC A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm discloses its carbon information to the CDP and 0 
otherwise. 
CDP 
ESG Environmental, social, and governance criteria. ASSET4 
CRI Carbon reduction initiatives (Haque 2017).  calculated by adding 1 if the answer is yes to 
the following 8 questions and 0 otherwise: (1) Does the company engage any emissions 
trading initiative? (2) Does the company show an initiative to reduce, reuse, recycle, 
substitute, phase out or compensate CO2 equivalents in the production process? (3) Does 
the company evaluate the commercial risks and/or opportunities in relation to climate 
change? (4) Does the company report on initiatives to recycle, reduce, reuse or phase out 
fluorinated gases such as HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons), PFCs (perfluorocarbons) or SF6 
(sulfur hexafluoride)? (5) Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, substitute, or 
phase out ozone depleting (CFC-11 equivalents, chlorofluorocarbon) substances? (6) Does 
the company make use of renewable energy? (7) Does the company have processes in place 
to improve its energy efficiency? (8) Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, reuse, 






The moderating role of institutional context 
To assess the moderating role, I introduce three institutional variables into Models (4) to 
(6) and three interaction terms,  STK_ASSU, ETS_ASSU, and CIS_ASSU.   
 𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀 
(4) 
 𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀 
(5) 
 𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐶𝐼𝑆 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐼𝑆_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜀 
(6) 
As hypothesized, the function of carbon assurance in improving carbon disclosure and 
minimizing information asymmetry is predicted stronger for firms in countries with a 
stakeholder orientation, in an ETS environment, and in a CIS.  
5.4 Results and Discussion 
5.4.1 Descriptive results 
Table 5.4 provides the distribution of observations of assured and unassured companies. It 
shows that the response rate to the CDP questionnaire has increased over time. In addition, 
the number of companies that have assured emissions (either Scope 1 or Scope 2) has 
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grown steadily from 2009 (62.93%) to 2014 (70.46%), which confirms the increasing 
demand for assuring carbon disclosure globally. This can be attributed to a heightened 




Table 5. 4: Observations of Assured and Unassured Companies  
 Assurance Scope 1 Assurance Scope 2 Assurance 
Year Total Yes % No % Total Yes  % No % Total Yes % No  % 
2009 321 202 62.93 119 37.07 175 171 97.71 4 2.29 175 150 85.71 25 14.29 
2010 892 461 51.68 431 48.32 839 454 54.11 385 45.89 888 393 44.26 495 55.74 
2011 1,037 611 58.92 426 41.08 1,029 597 58.02 432 41.98 1,024 555 54.20 469 45.80 
2012 1,145 731 63.84 414 36.16 1,070 724 67.66 346 32.34 1,127 680 60.34 447 39.66 
2013 1,280 874 68.28 406 31.72 1,268 869 68.53 399 31.47 1,270 825 64.96 445 35.04 
2014 1,381 973 70.46 408 29.54 1,367 961 70.30 406 29.70 1,371 917 66.89 454 33.11 
Total 6,056 3,852 63.61 2,204 36.39 5,748 3,776 65.69 1,972 34.31 5,855 3,520 60.12 2,335 39.88 
As carbon assurance is lagged 1 year, the sample period for assurance is from 2009 to 2014. 
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Table 5.5 exhibits, as expected, the average disclosure score is significantly higher for the 
assured group (84.186) than for the unassured group (71.012). The mean disclosure score 
for the group with Scope 1 assurance is 84.408 versus 72.269 for the group without Scope 
1 assurance; this difference is significant (t = 29.296, p < 0.01). Similar significant results 
are found for Scope 2 assurance, with 85.066 for the assured group and 72.381 for the 
unassured group. These results render preliminary support for the first hypothesis.  
Table 5. 5: T-tests of Disclosure for the Assured and Unassured Groups  
Variable Yes Mean (Yes) No Mean (No) Difference t 
ASSUt-1 3,852 84.186 2,204 71.012 13.174*** 32.615 
S1_ASSUt-1 3,776 84.408 1,972 72.269 12.159*** 29.296 
S2_ASSUt-1 3,520 85.066 2,335 72.381 12.702*** 32.186 
Paired-samples t tests are performed to test the difference in mean disclosure scores for the assured and 
unassured groups. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 5.3. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Table 5.6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used18. The full sample includes 
6,056 observations (of which 5,748 for Scope 1 assurance and 5,855 involve Scope 2 
assurance). Table 5.7 displays the disclosure scores grouped by country, it reveals the 
United States has the largest number of observations, making up almost 21% of assured 
observations in the sample. The presence of multicollinearity between variables is 
examined in the correlation matrix in Table 5.8. Table 5.8 shows that the correlations 
between variables included in the sample are relatively low and no extreme correlation is 
found, thus multicollinearity is likely not a serious concern in the estimation of the models 
in this study.  
  
 
18 Throughout, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to avoid extreme values (Luo et al 




Table 5. 6: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean Median S.D. 
D_SCOREt 6,056 79.39 82.33 16.40 
S1_ASSUt-1 5,748 0.66 1.00 0.47 
S2_ASSUt-1 5,855 0.60 1.00 0.49 
ASSUt-1 6,056 0.64 1.00 0.48 
CEIt 6,056 249.27 47.22 453.48 
lnTAt 6,056 16.27 16.28 1.43 
LEVt 6,056 0.19 0.18 0.13 
ENVt 6,056 71.69 85.58 29.06 
ROAt 6,056 0.05 0.04 0.05 
RDINt 6,056 0.01 0.00 0.02 
TOBINQt 6,056 23.02 22.35 15.97 
STKt 6,056 0.45 0.00 0.50 
ETSt 6,056 0.59 1.00 0.49 
CISt 6,056 0.24 0.00 0.43 





Table 5. 7: Descriptive Summary of Disclosure Scores by Country/Region 
 Observations With Assurance 
 
Observations Without Assurance 
 Country N Mean Media
n 
Min Max N Mean Media
n 
Min Max 
Argentina 1 70.76 70.76 70.76 70.76      
Australia 176 82.79 86.21 25.00 98.96 80 67.97 69.23 25.00 94.78 
Austria 27 82.90 86.97 49.00 98.96 9 66.31 61.00 47.00 92.00 
Belgium 23 83.39 87.46 62.00 98.96 8 71.57 77.00 40.00 93.00 
Brazil 76 81.29 85.34 25.79 98.96 46 73.16 75.50 46.00 96.00 
Canada 147 79.71 84.32 30.82 98.96 170 69.59 71.00 28.00 98.96 
Chile 1 95.82 95.82 95.82 95.82 1 53.00 53.00 53.00 53.00 
China 3 93.54 97.91 83.76 98.96 2 81.89 81.89 80.00 83.79 
Colombia 2 97.91 97.91 96.87 98.96 4 60.00 58.50 40.00 83.00 
Cyprus      4 65.75 64.50 50.00 84.00 
Czech Republic 1 36.63 36.63 36.63 36.63      
Denmark 57 78.99 80.89 25.00 98.96 36 66.13 64.50 46.00 92.00 
Finland 83 89.30 95.66 36.14 98.96 42 77.21 78.68 36.23 98.96 
France 241 84.06 88.11 29.31 98.96 37 63.50 62.12 34.55 98.96 
Germany 168 85.36 90.23 25.00 98.96 69 67.85 70.00 25.00 98.96 
Guernsey 2 86.42 86.42 85.38 87.47 1 69.69 69.69 69.69 69.69 
Hong Kong 32 83.31 86.51 49.09 98.92 2 40.50 40.50 39.00 42.00 
India 82 82.63 86.94 34.15 98.96 37 69.74 73.00 34.00 98.96 
Indonesia      1 45.00 45.00 45.00 45.00 
Ireland 31 83.16 84.32 51.36 98.96 11 79.25 78.00 51.00 92.68 
Israel 6 84.50 86.50 66.45 98.96 2 96.87 96.87 95.91 97.83 
Italy 93 83.64 87.01 36.00 98.96 15 75.76 78.38 25.00 98.96 
Japan 341 85.05 90.00 25.00 98.96 299 73.45 75.00 25.00 98.96 
Luxembourg 3 85.55 86.97 70.73 98.96 8 57.60 57.50 34.00 83.76 
Malaysia 2 70.59 70.59 55.30 85.89      
Mexico 6 76.81 82.76 41.38 98.96 2 72.13 72.13 65.26 79.00 
Netherlands 64 83.68 88.21 44.80 98.96 29 70.21 70.00 26.00 98.96 
New Zealand 9 80.08 75.96 60.00 98.96 13 73.70 69.69 67.00 93.00 
Norway 78 81.64 84.06 47.00 98.96 27 73.97 74.00 28.00 93.00 
Philippines 2 60.29 60.29 51.92 68.67 1 51.15 51.15 51.15 51.15 
Portugal 36 88.30 92.56 64.28 98.96 5 71.89 66.00 52.00 96.86 
Russia 2 60.65 60.65 55.30 66.00 5 48.40 50.00 33.00 65.00 
Singapore 7 78.27 79.10 63.09 94.78 2 83.00 83.00 72.00 94.00 
South Africa 168 90.15 94.57 52.97 98.96 79 81.43 83.00 55.00 96.87 
South Korea 150 88.55 92.95 27.00 98.96 16 76.53 78.57 25.00 98.96 
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Spain 123 85.82 90.59 36.14 98.96 9 66.80 71.90 25.00 96.00 
Sweden 95 81.68 84.41 41.59 98.96 95 74.27 75.00 34.00 97.91 
Switzerland 125 86.29 90.27 39.47 98.96 80 67.76 67.76 25.00 95.82 
Taiwan 50 81.27 84.56 38.33 98.96 9 60.02 64.00 37.00 81.00 
Thailand 5 96.45 96.86 91.64 98.96 4 74.68 76.36 62.00 84.00 
Turkey 10 89.39 91.64 62.37 98.96 21 83.09 88.00 44.00 96.87 
USA 798 84.89 89.56 25.00 98.96 604 70.72 72.00 25.00 98.96 
United Kingdom 526 81.75 84.36 25.00 98.96 319 68.79 70.89 25.00 98.96 
Total 3852 84.19 88.32 25.00 98.96 2204 71.01 72.94 25.00 98.96 





Table 5. 8: Correlation Matrix 
 D_SCOREt ASSUt-1 CEIt lnTAt LEVt ENVt ROAt RDINt TOBINQt STKt ETSt CISt 
D_SCOREt  0.41* 0.08* 0.22* 0.05* 0.19* -0.05* -0.01 0.01 0.07* -0.02 0.01 
ASSUt-1 0.39*  0.16* 0.29* 0.08* 0.25* -0.06* -0.02 -0.02 0.08* 0.02 0.09* 
CEIt 0.05* 0.14*  -0.10* 0.29* -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09* -0.10* 0.58* 
lnTAt 0.22* 0.29* -0.01  0.05* 0.39* -0.26* -0.05* -0.30* 0.06* -0.10* 0.02 
LEVt 0.05* 0.07* 0.19* 0.05*  0.00 -0.10* -0.09* -0.02 -0.04* -0.02 0.18* 
ENVt 0.17* 0.22* -0.04* 0.42* 0.02  -0.01 0.33* 0.13* 0.14* 0.06* -0.05* 
ROAt -0.03* -0.04* -0.09* -0.23* -0.13* 0.04*  0.20* 0.14* -0.26* -0.18* -0.07* 
RDINt -0.02 -0.06* -0.20* -0.05* -0.17* 0.15* 0.17*  0.35* 0.17* 0.01 -0.07* 
TOBINQt 0.01 -0.02 -0.13* -0.29* -0.08* 0.01 0.09* 0.22*  0.19* 0.14* -0.11* 
STKt 0.06* 0.08* -0.08* 0.06* -0.05* -0.02 -0.24* 0.09* 0.19*  0.46* -0.04* 
ETSt -0.02 0.02 -0.11* -0.10* -0.02 -0.03 -0.18* -0.02 0.13* 0.46*  -0.03* 
CISt -0.00 0.09* 0.53* 0.03* 0.16* 0.01 -0.09* -0.18* -0.11* -0.04* -0.03*  
This table presents correlations between variables used in multivariate tests for both hypotheses. Pearson correlation coefficients appear below the diagonal, and Spearman rank 
correlations appear above the diagonal. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 5.3. * represents significance (two-tailed) at 5%. 
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5.4.2 The impacts of carbon assurance on carbon disclosure 
Table 5.9 reports the regression results from Models (1) to (6). The initial results unveil 
that assurance (of either Scope 1 or Scope 2 emissions or total emissions) is positively 
associated with carbon disclosure scores in the subsequent year. Specifically, the 
coefficients of S1_ASSU are positive and significant at the 1% level in Models (1) and (4). 
Comparable evidence of a strong association is also documented for S2_ASSU. The results, 
therefore, corroborate Hypothesis 1 that assurance has a discernible impact on the carbon 




Table 5. 9: The Impacts of Carbon Assurance on Carbon Disclosure 
D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , +𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
      
 Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE 
S1_ASSUt-1 + 10.848***   8.242***   
  (28.43)   (20.93)   
S2_ASSUt-1 +  10.858***   8.387***  
   (29.94)   (22.55)  
ASSUt-1 +   11.269***   8.582*** 
    (30.56)   (22.43) 
CEIt +    0.001 0.001*** 0.001 
     (1.35) (2.73) (1.24) 
lnTAt +    2.434*** 2.376*** 2.404*** 
     (14.08) (14.13) (14.14) 
LEVt +    1.752 1.247 1.608 
     (1.18) (0.85) (1.10) 
ENVt +    0.042*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 
     (6.10) (6.39) (6.71) 
ROAt +    12.754*** 11.980*** 11.761*** 
     (3.28) (3.15) (3.10) 
RDINt +    6.519 8.798 6.434 
     (0.59) (0.81) (0.60) 
TOBINQt +    0.077*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
     (4.87) (4.82) (4.79) 
Constant  35.500*** 38.681*** 34.855*** -3.601 -0.588 -3.487 
  (2.73) (3.00) (2.65) (-0.28) (-0.05) (-0.27) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations  5748 5855 6056 5748 5855 6056 
R2  0.352 0.367 0.370 0.395 0.409 0.411 
Adjusted R2  0.346 0.360 0.364 0.388 0.402 0.404 
Definitions of variables are provided in Table 5.3. Coefficients are estimated with linear regression with robust 




The findings in Table 5.9 make good intuitive sense in a number of respects. First, as 
discussed by Hay and Davis (2004), financial auditing enhances the quality of accounting 
information and constrains earnings management. Comparable evidence is also 
documented in the environmental assurance literature (Moroney et al. 2012). Coupled with 
the findings in the mainstream literature, the results provide fresh evidence that carbon 
assurance is positively associated with the comprehensiveness of corporate carbon 
disclosure.  
Second, carbon accounting is a relatively new area, and no globally accepted standards are 
available for carbon reporting. This highlights the complexity and uncertainty of collecting, 
measuring, and reporting carbon information. Hence, even the management of a company 
may not be familiar with the information needs of stakeholders and the requirements for 
carbon disclosure. Carbon assurance has therefore emerged as an effective tool for carbon 
management. With assistance from assurance, a firm is able to complete a comprehensive 
carbon report. The results imply that directors strategically engage competent assurers in 
their decisions regarding carbon disclosure.  
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of CEI is positive—and significant in 
Model (5)—which indicates that firms with higher carbon emissions tend to disclose more 
carbon information. This is consistent with the prior literature (Deegan 2007; Bebbington 
and Larrinaga-González 2008; Luo 2019). lnTA has a significant positive coefficient as 
expected (Luo 2019). A comparable finding is evident for ENV. The results are intuitively 
appealing in that environmental management and carbon management are inherently 
interrelated (Liao et al. 2015; Luo and Tang 2015; Luo et al. 2013; Reid and Toffel 2009). 
The association between D_SCORE and ROA is positive and significant, which is 
consistent with Moroney et al. (2012). TOBINQ has a positive and significant relationship 
with the disclosure score as Luo (2019) reported. The significant signs of CEI, lnTA, ENV, 
ROA, and TOBINQ highlight the importance of including them in the model. No significant 
relationship is found for LEV and RDIN. 
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5.4.3 The moderating role of institutional context 
This section examines whether carbon-regulated institutions have an impact on the link 
between carbon disclosure and assurance. The interaction term STK_ASSU in Table 5.10 
is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting relationship between assurance and 
disclosure is conditional on the legal environment and the effects of carbon assurance is 
weaker in countries with a shareholder orientation,  The results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a, implying legal system and carbon assurance play a complementary rather 
than substitutional role in promoting carbon disclosure in a stakeholder-focused 
environment, which corroborates stakeholder engagement theory.  
Table 5. 10: The Moderating Role of Institutional Context 
D = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑆𝑇𝐾 , + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈_𝑆𝑇𝐾 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
D = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑇𝑆 , + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈_𝐸𝑇𝑆 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
D = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐶𝐼𝑆 , + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈_𝐶𝐼𝑆 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE 
ASSUt-1 7.350*** 6.744*** 7.643*** 7.655*** 
 (18.12) (15.89) (19.83) (19.94) 
CEIt 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.34) (0.19) (0.36)  
lnTAt 2.228*** 2.114*** 2.223*** 2.221*** 
 (13.39) (12.63) (13.39) (13.39) 
LEVt 1.699 1.699 1.450 1.465 
 (1.19) (1.19) (1.02) (1.03) 
ENVt 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (6.03) (6.05) (6.29) (6.28) 
ROAt 12.180*** 11.909*** 11.693*** 11.597*** 
 (3.28) (3.22) (3.16) (3.14) 
RDINt -0.138 0.156 1.601 1.329 
 (-0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.13) 
TOBINQt 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (4.78) (4.71) (4.81) (4.81) 
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STKt 0.000    
 (.)    
STK_ASSUt-1 4.261***    
 (6.65)    
ETSt  -1.555   
  (-1.33)   
ETS_ASSUt-1  4.636***   
  (8.18)   
CISt   -7.186*** -7.163*** 
   (-4.93) (-4.92) 
CIS_ASSUt-1   6.156*** 6.174*** 
   (7.56) (7.60) 
Constant -3.338 3.588 3.508 3.590 
 (-0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 6006 6006 6006 6006 
R2 0.422 0.424 0.423 0.423 
Adjusted R2 0.415 0.418 0.417 0.417 
Definitions of variables are provided in Table 5.3. STK_ASSU, ETS_ASSU, and CIS_ASSU are interaction terms used to 
test the impact of interactions between carbon assurance and the three institutional factors (STK, CIS, and ETS) on 
disclosure scores. t statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The interaction term ETS_ASSU in Table 5.10 is positive and significant, confirming that 
the existence of an ETS strengthens the association between carbon assurance and 
disclosure score (Hypothesis 2b). This is attributed to the heavily carbon-regulated 
environment in countries with an ETS. Last, the interaction term CIS_ASSU is 
significantly positive supporting Hypothesis 2c.  The intuition behind the finding is that 
Carbon-intensive companies undergo intensive review by stakeholders and are regulated 
by various government agencies. Carbon assurance could help these firms with more 
comprehensive carbon disclosure to legitimize their activities in such a strictly monitored 
environment. Therefore, the effects of carbon assurance on carbon disclosure are stronger 
for companies in carbon-intensive industries compared to those in non-intensive industries, 
which are less scrutinized by regulators. In sum, the spatial and temporal analysis uncovers 
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that the nuance of the dynamic effects of carbon assurance is conditional on the carbon-
related institutions around firms. 
5.4.4 The influence of carbon assurance on isomorphic changes in carbon disclosure 
I next examine the effect of carbon assurance on other aspects of carbon disclosure, i.e. 
whether carbon disclosure exhibits some sign of convergence under the influence of 
assurance. According to institutional theory, elements of institutions tend to reduce variety 
toward organizational homogeneity. DiMaggio and Powell (2012) contend that 
isomorphism is the process that best describes this homogeneity, and the external 
environment (such as competition and institutional pressures to adaptation and adoption of 
new values, norms, and attitudes) drive these isomorphic changes. Isomorphism takes place 
via three mechanisms: coercive (external pressures exerted by other organizations such as 
governmental bodies), normative (arising from professionalization) and mimetic (referring 
to the tendencies of firms to copy one another) processes (DiMaggio and Powell 2012; 
Scott 2013). Furthermore, institutionalization is impacted by the external environment, 
which itself is constantly changing, and firms influence one another to absorb these 
changes (DiMaggio and Powell 2012). Institutional theory has been applied to analyze 
organizational participation in carbon emissions trading (Pinkse and Kolk 2009).  
Therefore, I argue that corporate carbon disclosure tends to converge and this process is 
affected by external assurance. Third-party assurance is part of the external environment 
surrounding the firm, which represents outside influences from stakeholders. If a growing 
number of peer companies choose assurance, this is a coercive pressure on firms without 
assurance. Similarly, assurers may impose mimetic and normal pressure on their clients to 
implement a certain type of disclosure practice. Thus, the trend toward isomorphic practice 
will be more pronounced in companies with assurance than in those without assurance. 
Following de Aguiar and Bebbington (2014), I use the standard deviation of the carbon 
disclosure score as a measure of the convergence or homogeneity of carbon disclosure. It 
is expected that the standard deviation will be smaller in the cohort of assured companies 
than unassured companies. The test shows that assured companies not only obtained a 
higher disclosure score (84.19) than unassured companies (71.01), but also the standard 
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deviation of the score for assured companies (14.36) is lower than that for unassured 
companies (16.18). Levene’s test is run to assess the equality of standard deviations 
(variance) of the two disclosure scores and find the difference is significant at the 0.01 level 
(F = 52.01). This preliminary evidence is consistent with institutional theory. Despite 
assured CDP participants differ from one another in terms of size, economic activity, level 
of emissions, the volume of disclosures, their reports is more converged compared to the 
matched pair unassured cohort. One mechanism through which for the isomorphism to 
occur could be that the GHG monitoring, reporting, and verification process is gradually 
becoming institutionalized around the world particularly with ETS. External assurance (i.e. 
verification) not only enhances carbon disclosure but also accelerates the speed of 
isomorphism toward more comparable and consistent carbon reporting. This evidence 
corroborates the finding of de Aguiar and Bebbington (2014).  
5.4.5 Robustness checks 
5.4.5.1 Adopting a change analysis model 
To ensure the robustness of the baseline results, I perform a number of sensitivity tests. 
First,  I compare carbon disclosure scores of a firm before and after assurance using a 
change model. A significant change in carbon disclosure subsequent to the assurance 
provides stronger evidence of the effect of assurance. The model is specified below: 
 ΔD_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝛥𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , +𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(7) 
 ΔD_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝛥𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠




 ΔD_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝛥𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , +𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(9) 
The results are presented in Table 5.11. The coefficients of ΔS1_ASSUt-1, ΔS2_ASSUt-1, and 
ΔASSUt-1 are significant and positive, which shows that firms’ carbon disclosure increase 
when they initiate or resume carbon assurance. This result reinforces the main inference of 




Table 5. 11: The Impacts of Carbon Assurance on Carbon Disclosure—Change Analysis 
ΔD_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝛥𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , +𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
ΔD_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝛥𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
ΔD_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝛥𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , +𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔD_SCORE ΔD_SCORE ΔD_SCORE ΔD_SCORE ΔD_SCORE ΔD_SCORE 
ΔS1_ASSUt-1 + 3.770***   3.738***   
  (8.55)   (8.49)   
ΔS2_ASSUt-1 +  3.483***   3.470***  
   (8.54)   (8.52)  
ΔASSUt-1 +   3.608***   3.587*** 
    (8.17)   (8.13) 
CEIt +    0.001 0.001 0.001 
     (1.33) (1.30) (1.39) 
lnTAt +    -0.469*** -0.490*** -0.462*** 
     (-3.21) (-3.43) (-3.22) 
LEVt +    -0.110 -0.684 -0.461 
     (-0.08) (-0.53) (-0.36) 
ENVt +    -0.002 0.003 0.001 
     (-0.35) (0.45) (0.18) 
ROAt +    4.253 4.614 4.626 
     (1.25) (1.38) (1.37) 
RDINt +    6.311 7.732 7.511 
     (0.66) (0.83) (0.80) 
TOBINQt +    -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
     (-0.30) (-0.33) (-0.27) 
Constant  2.509 27.943*** 30.196*** 10.308 33.943*** 35.785*** 
  (0.27) (3.04) (3.26) (1.08) (3.59) (3.76) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations  4122 4214 4248 4122 4214 4248 
R2  0.053 0.052 0.050 0.058 0.056 0.054 
Adjusted R2  0.041 0.040 0.038 0.044 0.043 0.040 




5.4.5.2 The U.S. effect 
The U.S. effect is examined in light of the lower rate of adoption of assurance among U.S. 
firms (Simnett et al. 2009a; Zhou et al. 2016) and the fact that U.S. firms make up the 
largest share of the sample. I rerun the analysis excluding U.S. observations. In general, 
the results (not shown) are consistent with those presented in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. 
Specifically, i observe that assurance has a stronger impact in a stakeholder-oriented 
country. Comparable evidence is found with regard to the moderating effects of ETS and 
CIS.  
5.4.5.3 Level of carbon assurance 
In a financial audit, reasonable assurance would deliver a higher level of assurance than 
limited assurance which may have a critical impact on disclosure (Deegan and Blomquist 
(2006); Moroney et al. (2012). In the context of this study, carbon assurance has a unique 
distinction: Assurance often does not cover 100% of the emissions of the auditee, whereas 
all assets and liabilities are covered in a financial audit regardless of reasonable or limited 
assurance. Thus, I examine the effect of the proportion of emissions covered (i.e. the level 
of assurance) in an assurance. A higher disclosure score is expected when full assurance is 
provided (i.e., 80% to 100% emissions are covered) than partial assurance (less than 80% 
covered). Thus, I rerun the analysis using S1_ASSUCOVER and S2_ASSUCOVER as 
proxies for the level of assurance. Specifically, the level of assurance is coded into five 
categories: less than 20% (coded as 1), 21%–40% (2), 41%–60% (3), 61%–80% (4), and 
81%–100% (5). The models are as follows: 
 D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠




 D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(11) 
The results are shown in Table 5.12. The positive and significant sign of S1_ASSUCOVER 
and S2_ASSUCOVER suggest that the higher the level of assurance, the higher the carbon 
disclosure score. These results further nuance my knowledge that carbon disclosure is a 




Table 5. 12: The Effect of Level of Carbon Assurance on Carbon Disclosure 
𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
𝐷_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
  Predicted (1) (2) 
 Sign D_SCORE D_SCORE 
S1_ASSUCOVERt-1 + 1.853***   
  (12.98)  
S2_ASSUCOVERt-1 +  1.352*** 
   (12.07) 
CEIt + 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (4.14) (3.06) 
lnTAt + 3.796*** 3.750*** 
  (11.84) (11.34) 
LEVt + -0.687 0.244 
  (-0.29) (0.10) 
ENVt + 0.075*** 0.091*** 
  (6.83) (7.99) 
ROAt + 9.722** 10.156** 
  (2.06) (2.02) 
RDINt + 18.691 17.229 
  (0.91) (0.83) 
TOBINQt + 0.066** 0.063** 
  (2.45) (2.25) 
Constant  9.138* 11.341** 
  (1.74) (2.09) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
No. of observations   4605 4406 
Adjusted R2  0.409 0.394 
Definitions of variables are provided in Table 5.3. Coefficients are estimated with linear regression with robust 




5.4.5.4 Heckman’s two-stage tests 
I examine potential self-selection bias in this exploratory study in light of the voluntary 
nature of participation in the CDP survey, which could potentially result in an endogeneity 
problem with a biased or nonrandom sample. Thus, I perform Heckman’s two-stage tests. 
In the first stage, the following disclosure choice model is estimated: 
 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐵𝑀 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
(12) 
where DISC is a dummy variable coded 1 if the company disclosed its carbon information 
and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are selected following previous studies 
(Matsumura et al. 2014; Zhou et al. 2016; Healy and Palepu 2001; Kwak et al. 2012): Firm 
size (lnTA), leverage (LEV), book-to-market ratio (BM), environmental performance (ENV), 
and profitability (ROA). Moreover, I include a lagged indicator, DISCt-1, to control for the 
sticky pattern in manager’s disclosure decisions (Stanny (2013).  
In the second stage, I rerun the regression with Models (1) to (3). The results, which are 
reported in Table 5.13, are generally consistent with the baseline results in Table 5.9. Given 
that MILLS calculated from the first-stage model is nonsignificant, endogeneity is not a 




Table 5. 13: Heckman’s Two-Stage Analysis 
Step 1: Selection Model -- Decision to Disclose to CDP 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐵𝑀 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
Step 2: Response Model -- Impacts of Carbon Assurance on Carbon Disclosure 
D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 ,
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Response Model D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE 
S1_ASSUt-1 8.380***   
 (21.290)   
S2_ASSUt-1  8.710***  
  (23.800)  
ASSUt-1   9.134*** 
   (24.260) 
CEIt 0.000 0.001*** 0.001 
 (0.380) (3.080) (1.200) 
LnTAt 2.591*** 2.480*** 2.457*** 
 (14.480) (14.470) (14.230) 
LEVt 1.865 1.947 2.230 
 (1.250) (1.350) (1.540) 
ENVt 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 
 (6.890) (6.320) (6.580) 
ROAt 13.882*** 13.985*** 13.959*** 
 (3.490) (3.650) (3.660) 
RDINt 1.765 9.708 7.216 
 (0.160) (0.900) (0.670) 
TOBINQt 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.074** 
 (4.730) (4.740) (4.840) 
Constant 32.601*** 36.290*** 34.736*** 
 (10.870) (12.590) (12.040) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Selection Model 
   
lnTAt 0.191*** 0.187*** 0.179*** 
 (6.820) (6.750) (6.520) 
LEVt 0.055 0.032 0.007 
 (0.240) (0.140) (0.03) 
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BMt -0.127* -0.117 -0.120 
 (-1.660) (-1.540) (-1.590) 
ENVt 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (11.150) (11.030) (11.040) 
ROAt 2.643*** 2.703*** 2.556*** 
 (4.180) (4.320) (4.150) 
DISCt-1 3.562*** 3.538*** 3.550*** 
 (29.030) (29.630) (29.720) 
Constant -5.487*** -5.410*** -5.289*** 
 (-12.400) (-12.420) (-12.260) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
MILLS 1.944 1.395 1.230 
 (1.460) (1.090) (0.940) 
No. of observations 7,034 7,121 7,296 
Censored 1,347 1,347 1,347 
Uncensored 5,687 5,774 5,947 
Definitions of variables are provided in Table 5.3. Coefficients are estimated with linear regression with robust standard errors 
for the full sample of 5,685 observations. t statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
5.4.5.5 Absolute carbon emissions 
Recent studies assert that the intensity of carbon emissions provides a fairer comparison 
across different companies and different reporting periods (Hoffmann and Busch 2008). 
Despite this, for the sake of rigorousness, I also perform a sensitivity test using absolute 
carbon emissions. The results (not tabulated) do not alter my inferences from the baseline 
findings.  
5.4.5.6 Impression management 
As alluded to earlier, there is a concern that the positive association documented in this 
study may be driven by impression management. To detect impression management, one 
must use a reliable method to measure environmental performance, because the purpose of 
impression management is to hide inferior performance (Power 1991; Edgley et al. 2010). 
Thus, I include an additional variable—ESG (environmental, social, and governance 
score)—to measure environmental performance. ESG covers many actions, including the 
efficiency of resource use, emissions reduction, innovation, and CSR strategy (Refinitiv 
100 
 
2019). Thus, a higher ESG means the firm takes proactive initiatives for environmental 
protection. Such firms tend to adhere to a high standard of ethical behavior and demonstrate 
integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness in their business processes. If disclosure and 
assurance are driven by impression management/legitimation, disclosure would be largely 
symbolic, rhetorical, and lacking in substance (Moneva et al. 2006) and no real or concrete 
actions are taken to address climate change issues. Therefore, ESG can be used to capture 
impression management incentive because such activity would lead to a negative 
association between ESG and disclosure score.  
After I control for this proxy for impression management in both Heckman steps, the results 
still hold (see Table 5.14). Furthermore, the coefficient of ESG is significant and positive, 
which suggests that impression management probably does not motivate the sample firms. 
This is consistent with the prior literature, which argues that regardless of managerial 
capture, assurance is becoming stakeholder inclusive and tends to transform attitudes of 
managers toward their accountability to stakeholders and the natural environment (Edgley 




Table 5. 14: Heckman’s Two-Stage Analysis—With ESG  
Step 1: Selection Model -- Decision to Disclose to CDP 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐵𝑀 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑆𝐺 ,
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
Step 2: Response Model -- Impacts of Carbon Assurance on Carbon Disclosure 
D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑆𝐺 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑆𝐺 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑆𝐺 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Response Model D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE 
S1_ASSUt-1 8.152***   
 (19.57)   
S2_ASSUt-1  8.390***  
  (21.54)  
ASSUt-1   8.794*** 
   (22.01) 
CEIt -0.000 0.001** 0.000 
 (-0.43) (2.40) (0.36) 
lnTAt 2.054*** 2.083*** 1.957*** 
 (10.60) (11.09) (10.38) 
LEVt 1.872 2.345 2.462 
 (1.19) (1.53) (1.61) 
ENVt 0.034*** 0.043*** 0.035*** 
 (2.81) (3.67) (3.03) 
ROAt 12.263*** 13.402*** 12.521*** 
 (2.94) (3.31) (3.12) 
RDINt 5.953 10.871 8.979 
  (0.51) (0.96) (0.80) 
TOBINQt 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 (4.07) (4.07) (4.00) 
ESGt 0.133*** 0.108*** 0.125*** 
 (7.34) (6.11) (7.09) 
Constant 34.125*** 35.800*** 35.783*** 
 (10.53) (11.42) (11.43) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Selection Model    
lnTAt 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.150*** 
 (4.68) (4.56) (4.36) 
LEVt 0.298 0.260 0.235 
 (1.10) (0.96) (0.88) 
BMt -0.183** -0.185** -0.185** 
 (-2.01) (-2.04) (-2.06) 
ENVt 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
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 (6.27) (6.02) (5.93) 
ROAt 2.575*** 2.688*** 2.475*** 
 (3.49) (3.67) (3.45) 
DISCt-1 3.555*** 3.525*** 3.540*** 
 (24.83) (25.40) (25.49) 
ESGt 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (5.80) (6.03) (6.13) 
Constant -5.921*** -5.828*** -5.710*** 
 (-10.98) (-10.94) (-10.82) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
MILLS 1.833 1.256 0.768 
 (0.229) (0.393) (0.607) 
No. of observations 5,920 5,994 6,153 
Censored 896 896 896 
Uncensored 5,024 5,098 5,257 
Definitions of variables are provided in Table 4.3.  
t statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
I also test whether disclosing firms engage in specific substantive carbon reduction actions. 
I use an index of carbon reduction initiatives (CRI) for this test. CRI index reflects firm-
specific activities such as the use of renewable energy; improving energy efficiency and 
engaging in emissions trading; managing climate risks; and undertaking programs to 
mitigate or phase out carbon emissions. Table 5.3 detailed the emission activities employed 
to build the CRI index. The higher the CRI, the more active the firms in environmental 
actions (Haque 2017). If a firm is inclined to engage in impression management, it is 
unlikely to devote substantial resources to these activities, and vice versa. Therefore, I add 
ESG and CRI to the test model (see Table 5.15). Negative coefficients for these two action-
based variables would support, whereas positive coefficients would lead to rejecting the 
impression management assumption. The results show positive and significant coefficients 
for ESG and CRI, so the impression management motivation is rejected. Taken as a whole, 
the results provide fresh insight that reflects strategic changes in corporate responses to 
climate change due to growing coercive, memetic, and normal institutional pressure 




Table 5. 15: Heckman’s Two-Stage Analysis—With ESG and CRI 
Step 1: Selection Model -- Decision to Disclose to CDP 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐵𝑀 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑆𝐺 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝑅𝐼 ,
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
Step 2: Response Model – Impacts of Carbon Assurance on Carbon Disclosure 
D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆1_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑆𝐺 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆2_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑆𝐺 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 D_SCORE = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑈 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐸𝐼 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝐿𝐸𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑁𝑉 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , + 𝛽 𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁 ,
+ 𝛽 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑆𝐺 , + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Response Model D_SCORE D_SCORE D_SCORE 
S1_ASSUt-1 8.014***   
 (19.21)   
S2_ASSUt-1  8.287***  
  (21.29)  
ASSUt-1   8.650*** 
   (21.63) 
CEIt -0.000 0.001* -0.000 
 (-0.88) (1.87) (-0.13) 
lnTAt 1.837*** 1.834*** 1.718*** 
 (9.15) (9.41) (8.80) 
LEVt 1.827 2.235 2.370 
 (1.17) (1.46) (1.55) 
ENVt 0.022* 0.029** 0.021* 
 (1.71) (2.37) (1.77) 
ROAt 11.927*** 12.955*** 12.160*** 
 (2.87) (3.20) (3.04) 
RDINt 1.634 6.125 4.318 
  (0.14) (0.54) (0.38) 
TOBINQt 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 
 (3.92) (3.87) (3.81) 
ESGt 0.116*** 0.090*** 0.108*** 
 (6.29) (4.98) (5.95) 
CRIt 0.666*** 0.747*** 0.734*** 
 (4.04) (4.65) (4.58) 
Constant 38.164*** 40.367*** 40.225*** 
 (11.27) (12.31) (12.30) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Selection Model    
lnTAt 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.150*** 
 (4.68) (4.56) (4.36) 
LEVt 0.298 0.260 0.235 
 (1.10) (0.96) (0.88) 
BMt -0.183** -0.185** -0.185** 
 (-2.01) (-2.04) (-2.06) 
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Table 5. 15: Heckman’s Two-Stage Analysis—With ESG and CRI 
ENVt 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (6.27) (6.02) (5.93) 
ROAt 2.575*** 2.688*** 2.475*** 
 (3.49) (3.67) (3.45) 
DISCt-1 3.555*** 3.525*** 3.540*** 
 (24.83) (25.40) (25.49) 
ESGt 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (5.80) (6.03) (6.13) 
Constant -5.921*** -5.828*** -5.710*** 
 (-10.98) (-10.94) (-10.82) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
MILLS 1.561 0.963 0.467 
 (0.306) (0.512) (0.755) 
No. of observations 5,920 5,994 6,153 
Censored 896 896 896 
Uncensored 5,024 5,098 5,257 
Definitions of variables are provided in Table 4.3.  
t statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Thus, the results significantly nuance some findings in the extant literature. Prior studies 
form the consensus that assurance and reporting can be coproduced following a series of 
acts performed by auditors and auditees (e.g., Power 1991). The results suggest the auditing 
process is not necessarily a one-way influence of manager on auditor (managerial capture). 
Instead, carbon assurance can create a cooperative, mutually influencing situation that may 
eventually enhance both transparency of carbon disclosure and managerial accountability 
for the climate (Edgley et al. 2010). In other words, the series of acts performed by auditors 
and auditees can be constructive and interactive, create a dialogic relationship, and achieve 
a positive outcome. The empirical results nuance some conclusions of the prior literature 






5.5 Concluding Remarks 
There is a scientific consensus that anthropogenic GHG causes global warming. Extensive 
studies have been devoted to carbon management, whereas carbon assurance is somewhat 
under-researched. The purpose of this study is to examine the link between voluntary 
carbon disclosure and external carbon assurance using a theoretical perspective based on 
stakeholder engagement. This study has several key findings. First, companies with carbon 
assurance have higher overall carbon disclosure scores on average in a subsequent year. 
Second, the effects of carbon assurance on carbon disclosure vary with the presence of 
carbon institutions. Finally, carbon assurance may enhance the effect of institutionalization 
of carbon disclosure practices. Overall, the evidence demonstrates the effect of engaging a 
carbon assurer: Assurance adds certainty to carbon disclosures by not only boosting the 
confidence of users of the immediate carbon report but also enhancing the 
comprehensiveness and transparency of subsequent carbon disclosures. The cornerstone of 
the study is the stakeholder engagement theory. This theory emphasizes interaction, 
communication, and cooperation between management and groups of stakeholders, 
including assurers. As a result, firms with carbon assurance tend to have a better 
understanding of the expectations of stakeholders; thus, they can align their disclosures 
with stakeholder needs. Hence, the findings enhance the validity and applicability of 
stakeholder engagement theory and institutional theory. The findings in this study may help 
policymakers use carbon assurance together with other policy instruments to achieve a 
better outcome toward the goal of limiting global warming to below 1.5°C.  
In summary, as the current literature does not completely explain the impacts of carbon 
assurance on carbon disclosure, this study fills a few gaps: first, using an innovative method 
of content analysis to codify disclosure and compare it between firms with and without 
assurance, the study shows a quantified dynamic effect of carbon assurance on disclosure. 
Second, I decompose the relative roles and disentangle the effect of carbon assurance on 
the immediate versus lagged carbon disclosure. Assurance is costly, so recognition of the 
effect should help firms to maximize the benefit of carbon assurance. Further, with 
additional robust tests that provide inferentially identical findings to the main results, the 
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study documents persuasive circumstantial evidence that substantiates and vindicates the 
accuracy of this model and corroborates stakeholder engagement theory. Finally, I find 
spatial heterogeneity in the relationship between carbon disclosure and assurance, which 
indicates an asymmetric effect of carbon assurance on disclosure in different institutional 
contexts.  
I admit a number of limitations to this study. For example, the method only measures the 
comprehensiveness of carbon report but does not consider the detailed content of the 
disclosure. Furthermore, the sample used in this study only includes the largest companies; 
thus, caution is needed when extending these results to small firms. In addition, caution 
should be taken when generalizing the results to firms that do not participate in the CDP 
survey. Despite these caveats, the evidence provided by this research illuminates the link 
between carbon assurance and disclosure, to my knowledge the empirical evidence has not 
been seen in the extant literature.  
This research has practical implications. A general consensus is formed that the myriad 
challenges of the Paris Agreement put pressure on firms to undertake measures to enhance 
energy and carbon productivity. Firms face risks and opportunities in meeting stringent 
carbon mitigation targets and use negative emissions technologies,  adopt fossil fuel 
divestment strategies and decarbonize their business operations. Thus, carbon management 
becomes an utmost priority in corporate sustainability strategy development. This study 
aims to enrich understanding of the dynamics related to firm carbon management, 
disclosure and assurance. Despite this, the effects of carbon assurance have been virtually 
unexplored in the academic literature, knowledge of the dynamic effects is still very limited. 
Thus, there are enormous opportunities for further research for the emerging practice. For 
instance, disclosure is only one aspect of the overall corporate carbon management system 
(Tang and Luo 2014). Future studies may consider how carbon assurance can help firms 
strengthen their carbon management capability as a whole. Moreover, since carbon 
assurance and disclosure vary across institutions, future studies could examine the issue 
under other contexts, such as various corporate governance, economic, or financial systems. 
In addition, prior literature finds an association between cultural factors and sustainability 
assurance (Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez 2017); thus, the effect of culture on 
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carbon assurance is an interesting topic. Finally, few studies have examined how carbon 
assurance is practiced, so the knowledge of the differences in methodology, expertise, and 
approach between financial audits and carbon audits is scant. Thus, researchers could 
investigate carbon assurance using a case study methodology to offer further insights into 









CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
There is a growing interest in carbon emissions reporting which has enhanced the pressure 
on firms to set carbon reduction targets and undertake initiatives to mitigate carbon 
emissions (Romar 2009; Galbreath 2011; Depoers et al. 2016; Ioannou and Serafeim 2017). 
This interest stems partly from increasing pressure from recent major initiatives such as the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which have 
exerted increasing pressure on firms to be more transparent about their non-financial 
information, including carbon emissions. The growing interest can also be tied to the onset 
of emissions trading systems (ETS) and carbon taxes in many countries, which have 
emerged as key public policies for reducing carbon emissions. A wide range of 
stakeholders increasingly require firms to disclose carbon information for their decision 
making (Matsumura et al. 2014; Griffin et al. 2017). Consequently, carbon disclosure has 
become a critical part of annual business reporting. However, the quality and reliability of 
such disclosures are not guaranteed (Freedman and Jaggi 2005; Stanny and Ely 2008; Reid 
and Toffel 2009). Consequently, strong demand is emerging for independent verification 
of reports on greenhouse gas (GHG) (GHG; Green and Li 2011; Luo and Tang 2014; Zhou 
et al. 2016; Becker et al. 1998; De Beelde and Tuybens 2015; Francis and Schipper 1999; 
Francis 2004; Hay and Davis 2004; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Nevertheless, the 
literature on the assurance of carbon emissions remains very sparse (Simnett et al. 2009a; 
Datt et al. 2018). Thus, this thesis aims to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive study 
on both the determinants and impacts of carbon assurance.  
This chapter summarises the key findings of this study, the main contributions, the 
implications of this study for policymakers, investors and corporate managers, limitations 
of the study and the recommendations for potential future research.  
6.2 Key Findings 
Based on international samples of firms participating CDP over the period of CDP2010 to 
CDP2015, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of carbon assurance by 
exploring both the determinants of carbon assurance and the impacts of carbon assurance 
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on carbon disclosure level. The key findings of the study are discussed in detail in this 
section.  
6.2.1 Carbon information asymmetry and carbon assurance 
There is a clear trend for investors to identify and consider a firm’s carbon-sensitive assets 
of a firm (Haigh and Shapiro 2011), and the quantity, format and venue of carbon 
disclosure are becoming relevant for their decision making (Hughes et al. 2001). 
Meanwhile, multiple regulated and unregulated reporting initiatives and frameworks 
abound around the world. For instance, the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Guidance for Disclosure Related to Climate Change outlines the conditions for public 
companies’ disclosure of material information related to climate-associated risks and 
opportunities. More recently, it has become mandatory for listed UK companies to disclose 
carbon information in their annual directors’ report. 
This study focuses on the link between carbon assurance and carbon information 
asymmetry. The results of this study show that the three proxies adopted in this study 
capture different aspects of carbon information asymmetry. First, the quantity of emissions 
is associated with the complexity of the organisational structure, nature of the products and 
uniqueness of the manufacturing processes. Second, carbon information asymmetry is 
linked with the sophisticated technical carbon accounting protocols used to quantify 
different types of energy sources that convert energy consumption to emissions. Thus, 
information asymmetry increases with the type of energy consumed. Finally, carbon 
information asymmetry is higher in a carbon-intensive sector with regard to the complex 
impact of government-imposed regulations on firm operations. Using these novel proxies, 
the findings of the study depict the overall corporate carbon information gap and 
demonstrate its unexplored consequence on carbon assurance. The results show that the 
coefficients of these variables retain their positive signs across all test models, and further 
analyses yield similar findings. Thus, this study provides evidence on the sensitivity of a 
specific carbon initiative—carbon assurance—to different dimensions and levels of carbon 
information asymmetry. Further, the findings indicate the channels (such as enhanced 
credibility and reduced transaction costs) through which prioritising external assurance 
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generates value. Thus, this study significantly validates and increases the applicability of 
information asymmetry theory within the context of climate change. 
The in-depth empirical analyses determine a subtle distinction between carbon assurance 
and financial assurance with reference to their ability to inform stakeholders who care 
about firms’ financial and nonfinancial performance. Drawing on information asymmetry 
economics (Myers and Read 2001) and based on the fact that managers tend to use private 
informed data to contextualise their carbon performance and camouflage their inferior 
carbon policy, a direct inference from this study is that carbon assurance can enhance value 
(by reducing transaction costs), conditional on the severity of the carbon knowledge gap 
among the key stakeholders of a firm (Schiemann and Sakhel 2019). 
6.2.2 Carbon assurance and carbon disclosure 
There is a scientific consensus that anthropogenic GHG causes global warming. Extensive 
studies have been devoted to carbon management, whereas carbon assurance is somewhat 
under-researched. The purpose of this study is to examine the link between voluntary 
carbon disclosure and external carbon assurance using a theoretical perspective based on 
stakeholder engagement. This study has several key findings. First, companies with carbon 
assurance have higher overall carbon disclosure scores on average in a subsequent year. 
Second, the effects of carbon assurance on carbon disclosure vary with the presence of 
carbon institutions. Finally, carbon assurance may enhance the effect of institutionalization 
of carbon disclosure practices. Overall, the evidence of this study demonstrates the effect 
of engaging a carbon assurer: Assurance adds certainty to carbon disclosures by not only 
boosting the confidence of users of the immediate carbon report but also enhancing the 
comprehensiveness and transparency of subsequent carbon disclosures. The cornerstone of 
the study is the stakeholder engagement theory. This theory emphasizes interaction, 
communication, and cooperation between management and groups of stakeholders, 
including assurers. As a result, firms with carbon assurance tend to have a better 
understanding of the expectations of stakeholders; thus, they can align their disclosures 
with stakeholder needs. Hence, the findings of this study enhance the validity and 
applicability of stakeholder engagement theory and institutional theory. 
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6.3 Key Contributions 
This thesis focuses solely on carbon assurance to provide an overview of this new emerging 
assurance practice. By employing an international sample of largest companies 
participating in CDP questionnaire over a 6-year period, this study makes a number of 
contributions to the literature on environmental accounting and carbon assurance.  
First, carbon assurance deserves a separate study as it is an important dimension in carbon 
accounting and it is distinct from traditional financial auditing. The fact that firms in this 
study purchased carbon assurance in addition to financial auditing implies that carbon 
information asymmetry is a distinct dimension of information asymmetry concerning the 
authenticity of carbon information. The literature suggests some significant differences 
between financial assurance and carbon assurance (Datt et al. 2018). Traditional financial 
statement auditing is performed by the accounting profession while carbon assurance 
operations requires specific skills, knowledge, and expertise of relevant field like 
engineering, energy efficiency, and environmental management and carbon assurance is 
governed by separate standards (IAASB 2012; Tang 2019; Datt et al. 2018; Datt et al. 
2018b). Accounting professionals and environmental consulting companies provide 
different advantages for carbon assurance (Simnett et al. 2009a; Olson 2010; Huggins et 
al. 2011; Green and Zhou 2013). Accounting professionals have a greater reputational 
capital advantage because of their flagship financial statement auditing services (Simnett 
et al. 2009a; Huggins et al. 2011); however, providers from consultation firms tend to be 
less expensive and are generally considered to have better subject expertise (Simnett et 
al. 2009a; Huggins et al. 2011; O’Dwyer et al. 2011). When taking GHG assurance, GHG 
assurers must assess risk and uncertainty, as a firm may not have a robust system in place 
to collect and process energy and carbon data. Moreover, GHG assurers use different 
investigative methods than traditional attestation (ISAE 3410). Further, a firm may have 
a unique internal control mechanism compatible with the complexity of its operations and 
the nature of its business (IAASB 2012). In addition, misstatements might be related to 
the firm’s organisational structure and boundaries and related parties (IAASB 2012). 
Therefore, methods for controlling risk and examining GHG emissions in carbon 
assurance are expected to differ significantly from methods used in conventional financial 
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auditing. Therefore, carbon assurance deserves a separate study. However, research on 
this emerging practice still remains sparse (Datt et al. 2018b). This thesis enriches the 
understanding of this new type of assurance by examining carbon assurance from two 
perspectives—the determinants of the adoption of carbon assurance and the impacts of 
carbon assurance, thus contributing to the green accounting and assurance literature. 
Second, this is the first study to use carbon information asymmetry theory to explain the 
motivation of adopting carbon assurance. Reducing carbon information asymmetry entails 
carbon assurance that cannot be substituted with financial auditing. I use innovative proxies, 
namely the quantity of emissions, type of fuels used and membership in a carbon-intensive 
sector, to capture different aspects of carbon information asymmetry underlying 
managerial incentives to adopt GHG assurance. Specifically, emission volume is 
associated with the complexity of the organisational structure, nature of the products and 
unique manufacturing processing. Moreover, carbon information asymmetry is linked with 
the sophisticated technical carbon accounting protocols used to quantify different types of 
energy sources that convert energy consumption to emissions. Therefore, the more 
complex the energy structure, the higher the carbon information asymmetry. Finally, 
carbon information asymmetry is higher in a carbon-intensive sector with regard to the 
complex impact of environmental regulations on firm operation. With these innovative 
proxies for carbon information asymmetry, the findings of this study describe the overall 
corporate carbon information asymmetry and provide evidence on its unexplored impacts 
on carbon assurance. Thus, this study provides first-hand evidence of the sensitivity of 
carbon assurance to different dimensions and levels of carbon information asymmetry. 
Further, the findings unfold the channels (such as enhanced credibility and reduced 
transaction costs) through which adopting third party assurance creates value. Thus, this 
study contributes to the information asymmetry literature by proposing a new type of 
information asymmetry—carbon information asymmetry. 
Third, this study significantly validates and increases the applicability of information 
asymmetry theory in a nonfinancial setting by providing evidence that indicates the 
reactions of firms to global warming. Based on the fact that managers tend to use private 
informed data to contextualise their carbon performance and camouflage their inferior 
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carbon policy, this study provides inferences that carbon assurance can enhance value (by 
reducing transaction costs), conditional on the severity of the carbon knowledge gap among 
the key stakeholders of a firm (Schiemann and Sakhel 2019).  
Fourth, this study is the first to provide empirical evidence of the effectiveness of carbon 
assurance in enhancing carbon disclosure from stakeholder engagement aspects. Prior 
studies on carbon assurance have mainly focused on the incentives for voluntary adoption 
of carbon assurance, choice of assurance provider, the role of internal auditors in GHG 
reporting, the expertise required for GHG assurance, the development of an international 
standard for GHG assurance. However, while carbon assurance is expected to impact users’ 
perceptions, there is limited knowledge on the effect of carbon assurance on disclosure. 
This study documents that firms with carbon assurance tend to have a better understanding 
of the expectations of stakeholders; thus, they can align their disclosures with stakeholder 
needs. Specifically, assurers who adopt a stakeholder inclusivity approach understand 
better the needs of external stakeholders for carbon-related information. Thus, such 
assurance engagement involves greater interaction with external stakeholders, therefore 
ensuring that social and environmental reporting is responsive, complete and satisfies 
stakeholders’ need for information (Edgley et al. 2010; Thomson and Bebbington 2005; 
Owen et al. 2000). In another word, assurer can help managers select appropriate 
information and determine the scope and depth of this disclosure, thus, the underlying GHG 
report can be made more relevant and comprehensive. In addition, assurance providers 
could help strengthen a client’s internal system (Baker and Owsen 2002; Elliott 1994) by 
identifying deficiencies and detecting risks of existing reporting system and providing 
recommendations on improving a company’s environmental management systems and 
enhancing the design of internal control systems (Deegan et al. 2006; Moroney et al. 2012).  
Fifth, this study enhances the understanding of the role of the institutional context in carbon 
disclosure and assurance. There is no research on how these industrial and national factors 
moderate the link between carbon assurance and carbon disclosure. Last, Edgley et al. 
(2010) show the importance of stakeholder engagement in environmental assurance. The 
findings reinforce the validity and appropriateness of this concept in the carbon assurance 
practice. The evidence should assist assurance practitioners, regulators, and users of carbon 
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reports in obtaining a better knowledge of this indispensable practice in today’s low-carbon 
economy.  
Sixth, as the current literature does not completely explain the impacts of carbon assurance 
on carbon disclosure, this research uses an innovative proxy for carbon disclosure and 
compares it between firms with and without assurance to show a quantified dynamic effect 
of carbon assurance on disclosure. Moreover, this study decomposes the relative roles and 
disentangle the effect of carbon assurance on the immediate versus lagged carbon 
disclosure. Assurance is costly, so recognition of the effect should help firms to maximize 
the benefit of carbon assurance. Further, with additional robust tests that provide 
inferentially identical findings to the main results, this study documents persuasive 
circumstantial evidence that substantiates and vindicates the accuracy of this model and 
corroborates stakeholder engagement theory. Spatial heterogeneity is found in the 
relationship between carbon disclosure and assurance, which indicates an asymmetric 
effect of carbon assurance on disclosure in different institutional contexts. 
Finally, instead of using data from financial statements or CSR reports (Kolk 2003; Ballou 
et al. 2006), I utilise data from the CDP. The CDP database encompasses the most complete 
and consistent information in comparison to alternative sources (Luo et al. 2012). In 
contrast to sustainability or CSR reports, which are subject entirely to managers’ discretion, 
CDP employs a single set of guidelines that all participants are required to comply with, 
which ensures comparable responses between firms and minimises manipulation of the 
carbon data. The CDP is the source of data for many previous studies (Kolk et al. 2008; 
Stanny and Ely 2008; Reid and Toffel 2009; Stanny 2013; Matsumura et al. 2014). CDP 
collects carbon information from the largest listed companies around the world. 
Participation in the survey is voluntary, and companies’ responses are published by the 
CDP on its website. 
6.4 Potential Implications and Recommendations 
The practice of carbon assurance is still in its early stage and remains imperfect. Thus, the 
results are useful for regulators and accounting practitioners to take actions to improve 
their practice. Currently available guidelines for carbon assurance originate from very 
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different professional imperatives (IAASB 2012). Assurers adopt different investigative 
procedures, ethical standards and independence requirements, some of which are 
proprietary (Deegan and Blomquist 2006). The diversity of methodologies, strategies and 
practitioners increases the complexity of assurance (Scalet and Kelly 2010; Waddock 2008; 
Simnett et al. 2009a). Thus, a set of legally enforceable principles or norms should be 
implemented to regulate this emerging market and practice. The fact that these firms 
purchased GHG assurance in addition to assurance of financial statements implies that 
carbon information asymmetry is a distinct dimension of information asymmetry 
concerning the authenticity of carbon information. For this reason, governmental and 
professional bodies need to consider whether carbon assurance should be made compulsory. 
This study has practical implications. A general consensus is formed that the myriad 
challenges of the Paris Agreement put pressure on firms to undertake measures to enhance 
energy and carbon productivity. Firms face risks and opportunities in meeting stringent 
carbon mitigation targets and use negative emissions technologies,  adopt fossil fuel 
divestment strategies and decarbonize their business operations. Thus, carbon management 
becomes an utmost priority in corporate sustainability strategy development. This study 
aims to enrich understanding of the dynamics related to firm carbon management, 
disclosure and assurance. Despite this, the effects of carbon assurance have been virtually 
unexplored in the academic literature, knowledge of the dynamic effects is still very limited. 
Thus, there are enormous opportunities for further research for the emerging practice. For 
instance, disclosure is only one aspect of the overall corporate carbon management system 
(Tang and Luo 2014). Future studies may consider how carbon assurance can help firms 
strengthen their carbon management capability as a whole. Moreover, since carbon 
assurance and disclosure vary across institutions, future studies could examine the issue 
under other contexts, such as various corporate governance, economic, or financial systems. 
In addition, prior literature finds an association between cultural factors and sustainability 
assurance (Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez 2017); thus, the effect of culture on 
carbon assurance is an interesting topic. Finally, few studies have examined how carbon 
assurance is practised, so the knowledge of the differences in methodology, expertise, and 
approach between financial audits and carbon audits is scant. Thus, researchers could 
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investigate carbon assurance using a case study methodology to offer further insights into 
this emerging practice.  
6.5 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
I acknowledge that this study has several limitations. First, I only consider large listed firms 
in the research design, thus it is wise to exercise caution when applying the results to small 
or unlisted firms. Second, the sample of this research is only inclusive of firms that 
participate in the CDP, other ways that firms may choose to disclose their GHG information 
(e.g., sustainability statements) are not considered. Third, caution should be taken when 
generalising the results to firms that do not participate in the CDP survey. Fourth, there 
might be potential missing variables in the regression models which might impact the 
decision of adoption of carbon assurance. Finally, as alluded to earlier, although there are 
concerns about the assurance methodology used, this research does not examine how the 
assurance is conducted by different assurance providers (e.g., accounting firms or 
consultant firms). I leave this to future studies. 
To extend this study, future researchers may explore the causal effects of information 
asymmetry on assurance in different contexts. The unregulated carbon assurance market is 
still in its infancy, but it is quickly evolving into a sophisticated, specialised and 
competitive market (Green and Li 2011). However, little is known about how practitioners 
implement GHG assurance standards in practice and what are the determinants and impacts 
of different types of carbon assurance providers, which is worth studying in the future. 
Another interesting topic related to this research may be exploring the interrelationships 
between information asymmetry and firm voluntary carbon disclosure, and how 
relationship may affect the management decision on carbon assurance. In addition, it is 
important to explore how carbon assurance can help firms improve carbon reduction 
performance, carbon management systems and corporate carbon governance. Moreover, 
the relationship between firm value and carbon performance, including carbon reduction 
and assurance, is a promising area of investigation. Finally, accounting students need to be 
equipped with adequate knowledge of how to implement new accounting and assurance 
standards for GHG statements. Thus, it is necessary for university accounting faculties to 
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develop teaching materials for future generations of accountants who aspire to practice in 
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